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Abstract
Digital signatures are one of the most important cryptographic primitives in practice.
They are an enabling technology for eCommerce and eGovernment applications and
they are used to distribute software updates over the Internet in a secure way. In
this work we introduce two new digital signature schemes: XMSS and its extension
XMSSMT . We present security proofs for both schemes in the standard model,
analyze their performance, and discuss parameter selection. Both our schemes have
certain properties that make them favorable compared to today’s signature schemes.
Our schemes are forward secure, meaning even in case of a key compromise, previ-
ously generated signatures can be trusted. This is an important property whenever
a signature has to be verifiable in the mid- or long-term. Moreover, our signature
schemes are generic constructions that can be instantiated using any hash function.
Thereby, if a used hash function becomes insecure for some reason, we can simply
replace it by a secure one to obtain a new secure instantiation. The properties we
require the hash function to provide are minimal. This implies that as long as there
exists any complexity-based cryptography, there exists a secure instantiation for
our schemes. In addition, our schemes are secure against quantum computer aided
attacks, as long as the used hash functions are.
We analyze the performance of our schemes from a theoretical and a practical
point of view. On the one hand, we show that given an efficient hash function,
we can obtain an efficient instantiation for our schemes. On the other hand, we
provide experimental data that show that the performance of our schemes is compa-
rable to that of today’s signature schemes. Besides, we show how to select optimal
parameters for a given use case that provably reach a given level of security.
On the way of constructing XMSS and XMSSMT , we introduce two new one-time
signature schemes (OTS): W-OTS+ and W-OTS$. One-time signature schemes
are signature schemes where a key pair may only be used once. W-OTS+ is cur-
rently the most efficient hash-based OTS and W-OTS$ the most efficient hash-based
OTS with minimal security assumptions. One-time signature schemes have many
more applications besides constructing full fledged signature schemes, including au-
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thentication in sensor networks and the construction of chosen-ciphertext secure
encryption schemes. Hence, W-OTS+ and W-OTS$ are contributions on their own.
Altogether, this work shows the practicality and usability of forward secure sig-
natures on the one hand and hash-based signatures on the other hand.
Zusammenfassung
Digitale Signaturen sind eines der meist genutzten kryptographischen Primitive in
der Praxis. Sie stellen eine notwendige Technologie fu¨r eCommerce und eGovern-
ment Anwendungen dar und werden beno¨tigt, um Softwareupdates auf eine sichere
Weise u¨ber das Internet zu verteilen. In dieser Arbeit werden zwei neue Verfahren
zur digitalen Signatur vorgestellt: XMSS und dessen Erweiterung XMSSMT . Fu¨r
beide Verfahren werden Sicherheitsbeweise im Standardmodell gegeben, die Perfor-
manz analysiert und die Wahl sicherer Parameter diskutiert. Beide Verfahren haben
bestimmte Eigenschaften auf Grund derer sie den heute verwendeten Verfahren zur
Digitalen Signatur vorzuziehen sind.
Die vorgestellten Verfahren sind vorwa¨rtssicher. Dies bedeutet, dass selbst im
Falle einer Kompromittierung des geheimen Schlu¨ssels, zuvor erzeugten Signaturen
weiterhin vertraut werden kann. Dies ist eine wichtige Eigenschaft, die beno¨tigt wird
wenn eine Signatur u¨ber einen la¨ngeren Zeitraum verifizierbar sein muss. Daru¨ber
hinaus handelt es sich bei den vorgestellten Verfahren um generische Konstruktio-
nen, die mit einer beliebigen kryptographischen Hashfunktion instanziiert werden
ko¨nnen. Sollte die verwendete Hashfunktion aus irgendeinem Grund unsicher wer-
den, reicht es aus die Hashfunktion durch eine neue, sichere Hashfunktion zu erset-
zen, um eine sichere Instanziierung der Verfahren zu erhalten. Die Eigenschaften,
welche wir von der verwendeten Hashfunktion fordern sind minimal. Daraus folgt,
dass es eine sichere Instanziierung der vorgestellten Verfahren gibt, solange es u¨ber-
haupt Komplexita¨ts-basierte Kryptographie gibt. Daru¨ber hinaus bieten beide Ver-
fahren Schutz vor Quantencomputer-basierten Angriffen, solange die verwendete
Hashfunktion nicht anfa¨llig fu¨r solche Angriffe ist.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die Performanz der vorgestellten Verfahren sowohl
theoretisch, als auch praktisch evaluiert. Einerseits wird gezeigt, dass eine beliebige
effiziente kryptographische Hashfunktion eine effiziente Instanziierung der Verfahren
ermo¨glicht. Andererseits werden experimentelle Ergebnisse geliefert. Diese belegen,
dass die Performanz der vorgestellten Verfahren vergleichbar zu jener heute in der
Praxis genutzter Verfahren ist. Weiterhin wird eine Methode vorgestellt, die es fu¨r
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beide Verfahren erlaubt, optimale Parameter fu¨r einen vorgegebenen Anwendungs-
fall zu wa¨hlen. Die erzeugten Parameter erreichen dabei beweisbar ein gegebenes
Sicherheitsniveau.
Als Teil der Konstruktion von XMSS und XMSSMT , werden zwei neue Ein-
malsignaturverfahren (One-Time Signature Schemes, OTS) vorgestellt: W-OTS+
und W-OTS$. Einmalsignaturverfahren sind Signaturverfahren, die es erlauben pro
Schlu¨sselpaar genau eine Nachricht zu signieren. W-OTS+ ist aktuell das effizien-
teste Hash-basierte OTS. W-OTS$ ist das effizienteste OTS mit minimalen Sicher-
heitsannahmen. Neben der Konstruktion vollwertiger Signaturverfahren, finden
OTS Verwendung in Anwendungsfa¨llen wie der Authentifizierung in Sensornetzen
oder der Konstruktion chosen-ciphertext sicherer Public-Key Verschlu¨sselungsver-
fahren. Daher stellt die Konstruktion von W-OTS+ und W-OTS$ einen selbsta¨ndi-
gen Beitrag dar.
Zusammenfassend belegt diese Arbeit die Praktikabilita¨t und Nutzbarkeit vor-
wa¨rtssicherer Signaturen einerseits und Hash-basierter Signaturen andererseits.
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1 Introduction
Digital signature schemes are among the most used cryptographic primitives in
practice. They are means to guarantee for authenticity and non-repudiation of any
kind of data like messages, documents, or software. Digital signature schemes are
used to secure communication protocols, including SSL / TLS and SSH, to protect
software updates, and in many countries they have become legally binding like a
handwritten signature. Thereby, digital signatures enable applications like online
banking, e-Commerce and e-Government as well as online distribution of software
updates, secure communication, and counting. Today, there exist three signature
schemes used in practice: RSA, DSA and EC-DSA. There are some issues these
schemes have in common and we want to highlight them:
• When it comes to non-repudiation, additional measures from the field of public
key infrastructures, like time stamping, have to be applied to guarantee that
a validly generated signature remains valid for more than a short time period.
• The security of all three schemes is based on the hardness of certain problems
from number theory. These problems become easy if large enough quantum
computers can be built [Sho94].
• Only certain variants of these schemes can be proven secure and these proofs
are only heuristic, i.e. the proofs are either in the random oracle or the generic
group model. This means that there is no guarantee that it is really necessary
to solve the underlying hard problem to break the signature scheme.
• The schemes either rely on a specific hardness assumption or they make use
of a so called trapdoor one-way function. The latter is a notion that is hard
to achieve and unnecessarily strong from a complexity theoretic point of view.
In this work we introduce XMSS and its extension XMSSMT , two forward secure
signature schemes based on minimal security assumptions. We show that these
schemes solve all of the above issues without significant performance losses and
thereby constitute an interesting alternative to today’s signature schemes.
2 1 Introduction
Our schemes fulfill the notion of forward secure signature schemes (FSS). The idea
behind FSS is the following: Even in the case of a key compromise, all signatures
issued before the compromise should remain valid. This is an important property
for all use cases where signatures have to stay valid for more than a short time
period, including use cases like document signing or certificates. If for example a
contract is signed, it is important that the signature stays valid for at least as long
as the contract has some relevance. The solutions used today require the use of time
stamps [ETS10, ETS12]. This introduces the requirement for a trusted third party
and the overhead of requesting a time stamp for each signature. FSS in turn already
provide this property and thereby abandon the need for time stamps. Moreover, we
show in [BHW+13] that FSS can also be used to strengthen the security of actual
public key infrastructures.
Our schemes are hash-based signature schemes. Thereby, they can be instanti-
ated using any cryptographic hash function (as it turns out, we can also use most
block ciphers to build the required function families). This means, we simply have
to replace the used hash function and get a new signature scheme in case one in-
stantiation based on a certain computational problem turns out to be insecure. This
is in contrast to today’s signature schemes that can not be repaired if the under-
lying computational problem becomes easy. Moreover, quantum computers do not
threaten the security of hash functions in general [Gro96, AS04]. As there exist
many hash functions relying on problems that are assumed to be quantum secure,
XMSS and XMSSMT will still have secure instantiations in the presence of quantum
computers.
We give security proofs for XMSS and XMSSMT in the standard model. Thus, in
contrast to today’s signature schemes, we show that attacking one of these schemes
is as hard as solving the underlying problem. In our case this means we prove
that breaking the forward or standard security of our schemes is almost as hard as
breaking certain properties of the used hash function. In our proofs we make no use
of any heuristic argument like the random oracle model. Furthermore, all our proofs
are formulated as tight, exact reductions. This means, we exactly compute the
relation between the hardness of breaking the security of our schemes and breaking
the security properties of the used hash function and this relation is tight. This
allows us to make strong statements about the security of parameters.
Our proofs show that XMSS and XMSSMT are forward secure – which implies
standard security – if the schemes are instantiated using a second preimage resistant
hash function and a pseudorandom function family. Rompel [Rom90] - building upon
results by Naor and Yung [NY89] - showed that the necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of a standard secure digital signature scheme is the existence of
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a one-way function. This in turn is the minimal condition for the existence of
complexity-based cryptography. As pseudorandom function families and second-
preimage resistant hash functions can be constructed from any one-way function
[Rom90, HILL99, GGM86] our assumptions are minimal. This means, there exists
a secure instantiation of our schemes, as long as there exists any secure digital
signature scheme. RSA requires the existence of trapdoor one-way function families,
which is a strictly stronger assumption than the existence of a one-way function.
Moreover, all of today’s schemes use specific properties of the underlying hardness
assumption and can therefore not be constructed from any one-way function.
Rompel’s result combined with that of Naor and Yung already gives a construction
of a digital signature scheme from any one-way function. However, their construc-
tion is only of theoretical interest as the performance of this scheme is completely
impractical. In contrast, we show that XMSS and XMSSMT are indeed practical.
On the one hand, we present a theoretical analysis that shows that both schemes are
almost as efficient as the used hash function. Hence, given a practical hash function
both schemes are practical. On the other hand, we provide experimental results.
We present two implementations, one for regular CPUs and one for smart cards.
Experiments show that using today’s hash functions, both schemes can beat some
of today’s schemes in terms of runtimes. Key and signature sizes, while slightly
larger, are also practical — even on resource constrained devices like smart cards.
1.1 Contribution and Organization
The main contribution of this work is the development and comprehensive analysis of
XMSS and its extension XMSSMT . This contribution can be separated into several
technical contributions we detail now.
Background (Chapter 2) We begin with some background in Chapter 2. There
we present definitions of the basic security notions for hash functions and digital
signature schemes that we use in more than one chapter. Notions that are only used
in a single chapter are introduced in the respective chapter. We also introduce the
basic concepts of hash-based signature schemes that we use later.
New One-Time Signatures (Chapter 3) The basic building block of a hash-based
signature scheme is a one-time signature scheme (OTS). This is a signature scheme
where a key pair can be used to sign only one arbitrary message. In Chapter 3
we introduce two new one-time signature schemes called W-OTS+ and W-OTS$.
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Both schemes are based on the general idea of the Winternitz OTS (W-OTS) first
mentioned in [Mer90a]. W-OTS turned out to be the best choice of an OTS for hash-
based signature schemes for several reasons (see Chapter 3). Our constructions
outperform all previous variants of W-OTS in the sense that we require weaker
security assumptions to proof the schemes secure. This allows to reduce the signature
size while obtaining the same level of security as previous constructions.
More detailed, the only provably secure W-OTS construction known before re-
quired a collision resistant hash function family [HM02, DSS05]. We require either a
second-preimage resistant, undetectable one-way function family or a pseudorandom
function family for W-OTS+ and W-OTS$, respectively. These security assumptions
are strictly weaker than collision resistance. Moreover, the assumption that a pseu-
dorandom function family exists is minimal. Thereby W-OTS$ has minimal security
assumptions. We also assume that this is the case for W-OTS+, but we can not prove
it (see the discussion in Section 3.3). However, for W-OTS+ we achieve stronger
security and a tighter security proof. The latter allows for more efficient parameter
choices.
XMSS (Chapter 4) Given our OTS constructions, we develop our first forward
secure signature scheme XMSS in Chapter 4. It is the first efficient forward secure
signature scheme (FSS) with minimal security assumptions. Previous efficient FSS
are based on specific number theoretic assumptions, i.e. [AMN01, AR00, BM99,
CK06, IR01, KR03, Son01]. In addition, there are two generic constructions by
Krawczyk [Kra00] and Malkin et al. [MMM02]. They allow building forward secure
signature schemes from any secure digital signature scheme. However, their security
assumptions are not minimal and the schemes do not appear to be practical because
of their key size. We note that some of the techniques used for XMSS can be applied
to the construction from [MMM02] to solve these issues.
On the other hand, there are three other signature schemes with minimal security
assumptions in the above sense: [Gol09, Rom90, DOTV08]. They are not forward
secure. Moreover, the schemes in [Gol09] and [Rom90] are not practical and the
security proof of MSS-SPR [DOTV08] does not cover the pseudorandom key gen-
eration which is necessary for the scheme being efficient. In addition, compared to
MSS-SPR, XMSS reduces the signature size by more than 25 % at the same level
of security. This is an important improvement as the signature size is considered
the main drawback of hash-based signatures. However, XMSS uses the new tree
construction introduced in [DOTV08].
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XMSSMT (Chapter 5) Using XMSS the number of signatures that can be gen-
erated using one key pair is limited. The reason is that the runtime of the key
generation algorithm is linear in the number of signatures p. Hence, the key gen-
eration time constitutes a bound on p in practice. Multi-Tree XMSS (XMSSMT )
is an extension of XMSS, presented in Chapter 5. In contrast to XMSS it allows
for a virtually unlimited number of signatures. Therefor, XMSSMT allows a trade-
off between key generation time and signature size. The key generation time is
reduced from O(p) to O(p/d) for any integer parameter 0 < d < p while the signa-
ture size grows linearly in d. Towards this end, we apply the tree chaining concept
introduced in [BGD+06] and improve the idea of distributed signature generation
[BDK+07]. Besides virtually unlimited signatures, XMSSMT also enables implemen-
tations on resource constrained devices like smart cards with practical key generation
times. Previous smart card implementations of hash-based signature schemes did
not achieve on-card key generation at all [RED+08].
Optimal Parameters (Chapter 6) The performance of XMSS and XMSSMT are
controlled by many parameters, defining various trade-offs. We show how linear
optimization can be used to select optimal parameters for both schemes in Chapter 6.
This was done before in [BDK+07]. Unfortunately, the results given there do not
carry over to XMSS and XMSSMT as fewer parameters were taken into account and
the authors of [BDK+07] do not provide details about how to model the problem. In
this context we also show how to use the exact security reductions to compute the
security level of parameter sets in the sense of [Len04]. Our optimization chooses
optimal parameters for a given level of security.
Experimental Evaluation (Chapter 7) We evaluate the practical performance of
our schemes in Chapter 7. We present two implementations. A XMSS implemen-
tation for traditional CPUs and a XMSSMT implementation for smart cards. In
this context, we show how to implement the used function families for XMSS and
XMSSMT in practice using a hash-function or a block cipher. Our experimental re-
sults show that the performance of both schemes is comparable to that of RSA, DSA
and ECDSA. So far, there exists no other smart card implementation of a forward
secure signature scheme. We are only aware of a study on the performance of FSS
on traditional CPUs [CJMM03]. For hash-based signature schemes, there already
exist a lot of implementations. However, the only known smart card implementation
did not achieve on-card key generation [RED+08].
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Conclusion (Chapter 8) Finally, we draw a conclusion in Chapter 8 and discuss
possible future work.
2 Background
In this chapter we present some background for the work at hand. First, we fix
notation and give some formal definitions used through out the whole paper. We
only present the most important formal definitions for hash functions and signature
schemes. Definitions that are only used in one chapter are given there. Afterwards
we present some background on hash based signature schemes.
2.1 Notation & Formal Definitions
In this section we first fix some notation. Afterwards we present the formal defini-
tions of the most important hash function properties and digital signature schemes.
Through out this thesis, we write x
$←− X if x is randomly chosen from the set
X using the uniform distribution. We further write log for log2. We denote the
uniform distribution over bit strings of length n by Un. We write m = poly(n) to
denote that m is a function, polynomial in n. We call a function (n) : N → [0, 1]
negligible and write (n) = negl(n) if for any c ∈ N, c > 0 there exists a nc ∈ N
s.th. (n) < n−c for all n > nc. In all our proofs, we count runtimes in terms of
evaluations of a function family.
2.1.1 (Hash) Function Families
We now give formal definitions for the four most important properties of a (hash)
function family, namely one-wayness, second-preimage resistance, collision resis-
tance, and pseudorandomness. For the definitions we follow Rogaway and Shrimpton
[RS04]. We will also shortly discuss some relations between these notions. We re-
strict ourselves to function families that operate on bit strings and have a fixed input
size, as this is the case in our constructions. However, the definitions are the same
for the more general case. In the following let n ∈ N be the security parameter,
m, k = poly(n) , Hn = {HK : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n |K ∈ {0, 1}k} a family of functions.
We say a function family Hn is efficient if there exists a probabilistic polynomial
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time (PPT) algorithm that evaluates HK(M) for any M ∈ {0, 1}m and K ∈ {0, 1}k.
We require all used function families to be efficient, unless we state otherwise. We
call Hn a hash function family if Hn is efficient and m > n, i.e. Hn is compressing.
We start defining the success probability of an adversary A against the one-
wayness (ow) of a function family Hn. Informally, A receives a random output of
a function from the family and has to find a valid preimage under this function, i.e.
invert the function. Formally this reads as
SuccowHn (A) = Pr [ K
$←− {0, 1}k;M $←− {0, 1}m, Y ←− HK(M),
M ′ $←− A(K,Y ) : Y = HK(M ′)] . (2.1)
We next define the success probability of an adversary A against second-preimage
resistance (spr). Informally, the adversary receives a random element of the function
family and a random element of its domain. The goal of A is to come up with a
collision for the given domain value and function. More formally:
SuccsprHn (A) =Pr [ K
$←− {0, 1}k;M $←− {0, 1}m,M ′ ←− A(K,M) :
(M 6= M ′) ∧ (HK(M) = HK(M ′))] . (2.2)
The last classical property of a hash function is collision resistance (coll). Here
the adversary has to come up with two elements of the domain that collide under a
given element of the function family:
SucccollHn (A) =Pr [ K
$←− {0, 1}k; (M,M ′)←− A(K) :
(M 6= M ′) ∧ (HK(M) = HK(M ′))] . (2.3)
We say that a function family has one of these properties if it is efficient and
there exists no PPT adversary that has a non-negligible success probability. As an
example we give the full definition for a one-way function family. The definitions
for second-preimage resistance and collision resistance are obtained accordingly and
hence we omit them.
Definition 2.1 (ow). Let Hn be defined as above. We call Hn a one-way function
family if Hn is efficient and if for any t = poly(n) the maximum success probability
InSecow (Hn; t) of all possibly probabilistic adversaries A running in time ≤ t is
negligible in n:
InSecow (Hn; t) def= maxA {Succ
ow
Hn (A)} = negl(n) .
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The fourth notion we use is pseudorandomness of a function family (prf). In the
definition of the success probability of an adversary against pseudorandomness the
adversary gets black-box access to an oracle Box. Box is either initialized with a
function from Hn or a function from the set AF(m,n) of all functions with domain
{0, 1}m and range {0, 1}n. The goal of the adversary is to distinguish both cases:
SuccprfHn (A) =
∣∣∣Pr[Box $←− Hn : ABox(·) = 1]
−Pr[Box $←− AF(m,n) : ABox(·) = 1]
∣∣∣ . (2.4)
Using this success probability, we define a pseudorandom function family the fol-
lowing way.
Definition 2.2 (prf). Let Hn be defined as above. We call Hn a pseudorandom
function family, if it is efficient and for all q, t = poly(n) the maximum success
probability InSecprf (Hn; t, q) of all possibly probabilistic adversaries A, running in
time ≤ t, making at most q queries to Box, is negligible in n:
InSecprf (Hn; t, q) def= maxA {Succ
prf
Hn (A)} = negl(n) .
These notions are related. On the one hand there exist direct implications. It is
known that coll implies spr but the inverse does not hold. If for a non-negligible
set of elements H of Hn at least a non-negligible set of elements from the domain
collide with at least one other element under H, then Hn being spr implies Hn is
also ow. This is the case because if we evaluate a random H on a random element
x of the domain and hand the result to a successful inverter A, A will return x
with probability at most 1/2 if x collides with at least one other value. Thus, with
probability ≥ 1/2 A will return a different preimage. For a more detailed discussion
of hash function notions and their relations see [RS04].
On the other hand, there exist complexity theoretic relations. It is known that a
second-preimage resistant hash-function family can be constructed given any one-
way function [Rom90]. As the existence of a one-way function is the minimal as-
sumption needed for the existence of complexity theoretic cryptography, assuming
the existence of a second-preimage resistant hash function family means making
minimal security assumptions. It is also known that the existence of a one-way
function implies the existence of a pseudorandom function family. This follows from
the result of H˚astad et al. [HILL99] who show how to construct a pseudorandom
generator from any one-way function and the GGM construction [GGM86] of a pseu-
dorandom function family from any pseudorandom generator. It is noteworthy that
current research suggests that it is not possible to construct a collision resistant hash
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function family from any one-way function. Hence, the existence of a collision re-
sistant hash function family is a strictly stronger assumption than those mentioned
before.
2.1.2 Digital Signature Schemes
In the following we present the definitions for digital signature schemes that we
use. Regarding security we recall the standard notion of existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) introduced in [GMR88]. While
this notion suffices for most applications, sometimes a stronger notion is needed
called strong unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (SU-CMA).
SU-CMA secure signature schemes have a number of applications, including the
construction of chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes [CHK04] and group sig-
natures [ACJT00, BBS04]. We start with the definition of digital signature schemes.
Digital Signature Scheme
Let M be the message space. A digital signature scheme Dss = (Kg, Sign,Vf) is a
triple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms:
• Kg(1n) on input of a security parameter 1n outputs a private signing key sk
and a public verification key pk;
• Sign(sk,M) outputs a signature σ under sk for message M , if M ∈M;
• Vf(pk, σ,M) outputs 1 iff σ is a valid signature on M under pk;
such that the following correctness condition is fulfilled:
∀(pk, sk)←− Kg(1n),∀(M ∈M) : Vf(pk, Sign(sk,M),M) = 1.
Throughout this work signature scheme always refers to a digital signature scheme.
Existential Unforgeability under Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks
The standard security notion for digital signature schemes is existential unforge-
ability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) which is defined using
the following experiment. By Dss(1n) we denote a signature scheme with security
parameter n.
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Experiment ExpEU-CMADss(1n) (A)
(sk, pk)←− Kg(1n)
(M?, σ?)←− ASign(sk,·)(pk)
Let {(Mi, σi)}q1 be the query-answer pairs of Sign(sk, ·).
Return 1 iff Vf(pk,M?, σ?) = 1 and M? 6∈ {Mi}q1.
For the success probability of an adversary A in the above experiment we write
Succeu-cmaDss(1n) (A) = Pr
[
ExpEU-CMADss(1n) (A) = 1
]
.
A signature scheme is called EU-CMA-secure if any PPT adversary has only neg-
ligible success probability:
Definition 2.3 (EU-CMA). Let n ∈ N, Dss a digital signature scheme as defined
above. We call Dss EU-CMA-secure if for all q, t = poly(n) the maximum suc-
cess probability InSeceu-cma (Dss(1n); t, q) of all possibly probabilistic adversaries A
running in time ≤ t, making at most q queries to Sign in the above experiment, is
negligible in n:
InSeceu-cma (Dss(1n); t, q)
def
= max
A
{Succeu-cmaDss(1n) (A)} = negl(n) .
An EU-CMA secure one-time signature scheme (OTS) is a Dss that is EU-CMA
secure as long as the number of oracle queries of the adversary is limited to one, i.e.
q = 1. In the case of SU-CMA security the adversary also succeeds if it returns a
new signature on a message sent to Sign before. Hence, we obtain a definition for
SU-CMA security replacing the last line in ExpEU-CMADss(1n) (A) by
Return 1 iff Vf(pk,M?, σ?) = 1 and (M?, σ?) 6∈ {(Mi, σi)}q1 .
2.2 Hash-based Signature Schemes
The signature schemes that we present in this work are hash-based signature schemes.
The idea of hash-based signatures was introduced by Merkle [Mer90a] and the results
in [BM96, BDE+11, BDK+07, BDS08, BDS09, BGD+06, DOTV08, DSS05, Gar05,
HM02, JLMS03, Szy04] improve the Merkle idea in many respects by providing new
algorithmic ideas and security proofs. In this section we present the basic ideas of
hash based signature schemes. Moreover, we discuss so called tree traversal algo-
rithms. These algorithms play a central role regarding the efficiency of hash based
signature schemes and we will refer to this subsection several times. We begin this
section with a hash-based one-time signature scheme.
12 2 Background
2.2.1 The Lamport-Diffie One-Time Signature Scheme
At the heart of a hash-based signature scheme is a hash-based OTS. The first and
most intuitive proposal for such an OTS is Lamport’s scheme (sometimes called
Lamport-Diffie OTS) [Lam79]. With this scheme the basic ideas for hash-based
OTS were introduced. The OTS we present later in this work are based on the
same general idea. The scheme uses any one-way function H, i.e. H = HK ∈ Hn
as defined above, and signs l bit messages. The secret key consists of 2l random bit
strings
sk = (sk1,0, sk1,1, . . . , skl,0, skl,1)
of length m. The public key consists of the 2l outputs of the one-way function
pk = (pk1,0, pk1,1, . . . , pkl,0, pkl,1) = (H(sk1,0),H(sk1,1), . . . ,H(skl,0),H(skl,1))
when evaluated on the elements of the secret key. Signing a message M ∈ {0, 1}l
corresponds to publishing the corresponding elements of the secret key:
σ = (σ1, . . . , σl) = (sk1,M1 , . . . , skl,Ml).
To verify a signature the verifier checks whether the elements of the signature are
mapped to the right elements of the public key using H:
(H(σ1), . . . ,H(σl))
?
= (pk1,M1 , . . . , pkl,Ml)
The reason for the scheme being one-time is that a signature contains half of the
secret key. Hence, an adversary would simply ask for two signatures – namely the
signatures on 0l and 1l – to be able to sign any message of her choice. However, if
an adversary only knows the signature on one message, an existential forgery would
contain a preimage for at least one element of the public key that was not contained
in the signature before. The scheme can be proven EU-CMA-secure if the function
used is one-way [BDS09]. It is also straightforward to prove that the scheme is
SU-CMA-secure if the used function is second-preimage resistant.
2.2.2 The Merkle Signature Scheme
Given an OTS like the one from above we now show how to construct a many-time
signature scheme. The method was introduced by Merkle in [Mer90a]. For this
reason hash-based signature schemes are sometimes also called Merkle Signature
Schemes (MSS). The many-time signature schemes presented in this work are based
on this method but we use and introduce some improvements for the basic method
presented here.
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Figure 2.1: The Merkle Tree construction
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The idea is to use many OTS key pairs and authenticate the public keys using a
binary authentication tree, called Merkle Tree. The root of the tree becomes the new
public key and the OTS secret keys become the overall secret key. More specifically,
given a tree height h and a collision-resistant hash function H = HK ∈ Hn the
key generation works as follows. First 2h OTS key pairs (pki, ski), 0 ≤ i < 2h are
generated. The secret key SK = (sk0, . . . , sk2h−1) consists of the 2h OTS secret keys.
The 2h leaves of the tree are the hash values of the 2h OTS public keys using H:
Li = H(pki). The nodes Ni,j in the tree are computed as the hash value of the
concatenation of their child nodes:
Ni,j = H(N2i,j−1||N2i+1,j−1)
for 0 < j ≤ h. The single hash value that represents the root of the tree is the
overall public key PK. The construction of the public key is shown in Figure 2.1.
To sign the ith message the ith OTS secret key is used. The signature Σ =
(i, σi, pki,Authi) contains the index i, the obtained OTS signature σi, the corre-
sponding OTS public key pki and the authentication path for pki. The authentica-
tion path for pki is the set of all siblings of the nodes on the path from Li to the
root. Figure 2.2 shows the authentication path for some pki. To verify a signature,
first the OTS signature is verified. Then a root value is computed using the OTS
public key from the signature and the authentication path. If the obtained root
value equals the one contained in PK, the signature is accepted. Otherwise it is
rejected.
It can be shown that this construction is EU-CMA-secure if the used OTS is
EU-CMA-secure and the used hash function is taken from a collision resistant hash
function family [BDS09]. The intuition for the proof is that an adversary, that
successfully forges a signature, either generated a forgery for one of the OTS key
pairs or that it replaced one of the OTS key pairs by one for which it knows the
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secret key. In the second case, it follows from the pigeonhole principle that the
authentication path for the original OTS public key and that for the OTS public
key contained in the forgery must collide at some point. This gives us a collision for
H.
To understand the next subsection, one improvement of this basic scheme is
needed. The construction described here results in a secret key that grows lin-
early in the number of signatures a key pair can be used for. For this reason, all
practical MSS constructions use a pseudorandom generator to generate the OTS
key pairs. In this case, the OTS key pairs are deleted after key generation and
recomputed when needed.
2.2.3 Tree Traversal Algorithms
The most costly part in the signature generation algorithm is the computation of the
authentication path described above. For this task so called tree traversal algorithms
are used. An authentication path for a tree of height h consists of h nodes, one node
on each level 0 ≤ j < h of the tree. The computation of a node on level j requires
the computation of 2j leaves and 2j − 1 computations of inner nodes of the tree.
In many cases the authentication paths of two sequential signatures differ only in a
few nodes. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the number of nodes that have to be
computed by storing the last authentication path in a state. However, in the worst
case a new node on each level is required. Hence, 2h − 1 leaves and 2h − h inner
nodes have to be computed if the nodes are computed when needed.
There exist several proposals for tree traversal algorithms [BKN07, BDS08, Szy04,
JLMS03] that are much more efficient than the straightforward approach above. A
detailed overview can be found in [BDS09]. In this work we use the BDS algorithm
by Buchmann et al. [BDS08] because it is the only algorithm that takes into account
that leaf computation requires more effort than the computation of an inner node.
Figure 2.2: The authentication path for leaf i
j = h
j = 0
i
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This difference in computational costs grows if the OTS public keys are not stored,
which is the case for all our MSS proposals. The basic building block of BDS is the
TreeHash algorithm proposed by Merkle [Mer90a] that can be used to compute a
node of the tree. Algorithm 2.1 shows TreeHash as used by BDS. The algorithm
works on a stack Stack that is updated each time the algorithm is called. As input
the algorithm takes Stack and the index of the next leaf to process. It outputs an
updated Stack. The required node is the only remaining node on Stack after 2j calls
to TreeHash for a node on level j. It uses the method LeafCalc as a subroutine.
Given an index, LeafCalc computes the corresponding leaf node of the tree. The
implementation of LeafCalc depends on the MSS for which BDS is used.
Algorithm 2.1: TreeHash
Input: Stack, leaf index φ
Output: Updated Stack
1 N= LeafCalc (φ);
2 while top node on Stack has same height as N do
3 N ←− H ((Stack.pop()||N));
4 end
5 Stack.push(N);
6 return Stack
The BDS algorithm is parameterized by the BDS parameter k defining a time-
memory trade-off. It reduces the worst case runtime per signature generation from
2h− 1 to (h− k)/2 evaluations of TreeHash and hence only (h− k)/2 leaf compu-
tations. More specifically, the BDS algorithm does three things. First, it uses the
fact that a node which is a left child can be computed from values that occurred in
an authentication path before, spending only one evaluation of H. Second, it stores
the right nodes from the top k levels of the tree during key generation. Third, it dis-
tributes the computations for right child nodes among previous authentication path
computations. BDS computes one node on every tree level 0 ≤ j < h−k in parallel
using Treehash. The main part of BDS is the scheduling of these h − k computa-
tions. During every authentication path computation, BDS distributes (h − k)/2
updates among the running computations. This is done such that the computation
of all nodes required for authentication path i + 1 is finished during the ith signa-
ture generation. The computation of the next right node on a level starts when the
last computed right node becomes part of the authentication path. To achieve this,
BDS uses a state StateBDS of no more than
(
3h+
⌊
h
2
⌋− 3k − 2 + 2k) tree nodes
that is initialized during key generation. To compute the authentication paths the
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BDS algorithm spends (h− k)/2 leaf computations and evaluations of TreeHash
per signature. For more details see [BDS08].
3 New Variants of theWinternitz One
Time Signature Scheme
In this chapter we present the idea of the Winternitz One-Time Signature Scheme
(W-OTS) first proposed in [Mer90a] and introduce two new variants of W-OTS. We
prove the first variant strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks
in the standard model if a second-preimage resistant, undetectable one-way func-
tion family is used. For the second variant we prove existential unforgeability under
adaptive chosen message attacks if it is instantiated using a pseudorandom function
family. Towards this end, we introduce the notion of a function chain and give a
generic description of W-OTS using this new notion. We introduce two security no-
tions for function chains and use them to prove W-OTS EU-CMA and SU-CMA
secure, respectively. Finally, we present two constructions of function chains that ful-
fill these security properties and lead to the two instantiations mentioned above. We
start with the generic description of W-OTS, including the definition of a function
chain. Afterwards, we present the security proofs and different chain constructions.
The contributions of this chapter were published as parts of [1, 6, 7].
3.1 The Winternitz One-Time Signature Scheme
In this section we present a generic description of W-OTS using function chains,
which we also introduce here. Intuitively, a function chain generates an ordered set
– i.e. a chain – of values using a function (family) given a start value. The core
idea of W-OTS is to use a certain number of such function chains starting from
random values. These random values are the secret key. The public key consists of
the final outputs of the chains, i.e. the end of each chain. A signature is computed
by mapping the message to one intermediate value of each function chain. We start
with the definition of function chains. Afterwards we present W-OTS.
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3.1.1 Function Chains
In the following we formally introduce the notion of a function chain and two security
properties for function chains. A function chain might be seen as some mode of
operation for a function (family). More specifically, a function chain consists of
two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms: An initialization algorithm I that
generates a public chain key ck and an evaluation algorithm E that allows to compute
the function chain. Actually, the evaluation algorithm does not simply compute the
last value of the chain, but given a value of the chain it allows to perform one
or more iterations of the function chain to obtain a succeeding value of the chain.
There are two important details in our definition. First, the initialization algorithm
takes the chain length as input. For this reason the length of a chain is fixed
during initialization and the chain key can depend on the length. Furthermore, the
evaluation algorithm takes as input which iteration of the chain the given input value
belongs to and the output for which iteration of the chain should be computed, with
the restriction that only the values of subsequent iterations can be computed. These
two details make it possible, that iterations might differ, i.e. they might depend on
their position in the chain. The notion of function chains might be interesting on its
own, i.e. to formalize methods that make the computation of password digests more
expensive to prevent brute-force attacks. Now, we first present the formal notion.
For a better understanding, we give a little example afterwards. Then we define the
security properties.
Definition 3.1 (Function Chain). Let n ∈ N be the security parameter, domain D
and key space K be sets whose elements have a description length polynomial in n.
A function chain C = (I,E) is a pair of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
• I(1n, λ), the initialization algorithm, on input of the security parameter n in
unary and a chain length parameter λ ∈ N returns a public chain key ck ∈ K.
• E i,jck (X), the evaluation algorithm, on input of a value X ∈ D, an interval
i, j ∈ N, 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ λ and a chain key ck ∈ K returns Y ∈ D, the jth value
of the chain assuming X is the ith value of the chain.
such that
(∀n, λ ∈ N), (∀ck←− I(1n, λ)), (∀i, j,m ∈ N, 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m ≤ λ), (∀X ∈ D) :
E j,mck (E i,jck (X)) = E i,mck (X).
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The correctness condition above simply says that it is possible to continue the
evaluation of C from any intermediate value without changing the final result, as
long as the same chain key is used. Please note that the above definition implies
E i,jck (X) = X if i = j. To simplify notation, we omit the chain key whenever its
value is clear from the context. We also omit the first index i for E if it is zero, i.e.
E jck(X) = E0,jck (X). We assume that the security parameter n, the chain length λ
and the domain D can either be derived from ck or are publicly known.
To get a better idea of this notion, take the following example:
Construction 3.2 (Example). For a given n ∈ N, let
Fn = {FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n}
be a function family. Then we can construct a function chain with the following two
algorithms operating on K = D = {0, 1}n:
• I(1n, λ) chooses a function key K $←− {0, 1}n and returns ck = (K,λ).
• E i,jck (X) given X ∈ {0, 1}n applies FK j − i times on X, i.e. it returns Y =
Fj−iK (X) ∈ {0, 1}n.
We leave it to the reader to check the correctness condition for this function chain.
We require a function chain to provide some security property when we use it for
W-OTS. Informally, to achieve EU-CMA security we require the function chain to
fulfill some kind of one-wayness. For the stronger notion of SU-CMA security, we
need something like second-preimage resistance. We now define these two properties.
We start with the one-wayness property. In previous works [GKL88, EGM96, DSS05]
it was already analyzed what it means for the iteration of a function to be one-way.
We define our notion for function chains similar to Dods et al. [DSS05] and reuse
their name one-deeper preimage resistance (odp).
The reasoning behind odp is as follows. In most applications, including W-OTS,
the final output Z of the function chain is used as some kind of verification value,
similar to a message digest. Now, the adversary learns some intermediate value Y
of the function chain that is the output of the ith iteration. A first idea would be
to ask that it is impossible for the adversary to come up with a value X that is
the output of a preceding iteration j < i and maps to Y after i− j iterations. But
this misses the needs of the above application. The reason is that there might exist
many more values that are possible outcomes of an iteration j < i, which lead to
Z as final output of the chain, but do not lead to Y as the ith intermediate value.
For this reason, we say that the adversary quasi inverts the function chain and
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thereby breaks the odp property if it comes up with such a X. This is formalized
in the following success probability of an adversary A against the odp resistance of
a function chain C(1n, λ):
SuccodpC(1n,λ) (A) =Pr [ ck←− I(1n, λ);U $←− D, i $←− [1, λ];Y ←− E ick(U),
(X, j)
$←− A(ck, i, Y ) : 0 ≤ j < i; E i,λck (Y ) = E j,λck (X)
]
Using this, we define odp for function chains as follows
Definition 3.3 (odp for function chains). Let n, λ, t ∈ N, t = poly(n), C =(I,E) a
function chain as described in Definition 3.1. We call C(1n, λ) odp resistant if the
success probability SuccodpC(1n,λ) (A) of any adversary A running in time less or equal
t is negligible in n:
InSecodp (C(1n, λ); t) def= max
A
{SuccodpC(1n,λ) (A)} = negl(n) .
To achieve SU-CMA security we will also need some kind of second-preimage
resistance that we call second-origin resistance (so). In this case, the intuition is
that it should also be impossible for the adversary to come up with a new Y ′ which
is a possible output of the ith iteration and maps to the same final output Z ′ = Z
as Y . Obviously, it makes no sense to allow i = λ in this case as this would mean
that we have two contradicting requirements, i.e. Y 6= Y ′ and Y = Z = Z ′ = Y ′.
We formalize this using the following success property of an adversary A against
the so resistance of a function chain C(1n, λ):
SuccsoC(1n,λ) (A) =Pr [ ck←− I(1n, λ);U $←− D, i $←− [0, λ− 1];Y ←− E ick(U),
(Y ′) $←− A(ck, i, Y ) : Y 6= Y ′; E i,λck (Y ) = E i,λck (Y ′)
]
Using this, we define so for function chains as follows
Definition 3.4 (so for function chains). Let n, λ, t ∈ N, t = poly(n), C =(I,E) a
function chain as described in Definition 3.1. We call C(1n, λ) so resistant if the
success probability SuccsoC(1n,λ) (A) of any adversary A running in time less or equal
t is negligible in n:
InSecso (C(1n, λ); t) def= max
A
{SuccsoC(1n,λ) (A)} = negl(n) .
3.1.2 W-OTS
Now, we give a generic description of W-OTS using function chains as defined above.
We start describing the parameters of the scheme. Afterwards, we present the three
algorithms of the signature scheme.
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Parameters: W-OTS is parameterized by security parameter n, the binary mes-
sage length m, and the Winternitz parameter w ∈ N, w > 1 that determines the
time-memory trade-off. The last two parameters are used to compute
`1 =
⌈
m
log(w)
⌉
, `2 =
⌊
log(`1(w − 1))
log(w)
⌋
+ 1, ` = `1 + `2.
Moreover, it uses a function chain C. These parameters are publicly known. We
can now describe the three algorithms of the scheme.
Key Generation Algorithm (Kg(1n)): On input of security parameter n in unary
the key generation algorithm choses ` values sk = (sk1, . . . , sk`)
$←− D` uniformly
at random that form the secret key. Next, Kg initializes the function chain ck ←−
I(1n, w − 1) and obtains a chain public key. The public verification key pk is com-
puted as
pk = (pk0, pk1, . . . , pk`) = (ck, Ew−1ck (sk1), . . . , Ew−1ck (sk`)) .
Signature Algorithm (Sign(M, sk)): On input of a message M ∈ {0, 1}m and the
secret signing key sk, the signature algorithm first computes a base w representation
of M : M = (b1 . . . b`1), bi ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1}. Next it computes the checksum
C =
`1∑
i=1
(w − 1− bi)
and represents it as `2 base w numbers C = (b`1+1, . . . , b`). The length of the base-w
representation of C is at most `2 since C ≤ `1(w − 1). We set B = (b1, . . . , b`) =
M ‖ C, the concatenation of the base w representations of M and C. The signature
is computed as
σ = (σ1, . . . , σ`) = (Eb1ck (sk1), . . . , Eb`ck(sk`).
Please note that the checksum guarantees that given the B corresponding to one
message M , for any other message M ′ 6= M the corresponding B′ includes at least
one b′i < bi for 0 < i ≤ `.
Verification Algorithm (Vf(M,σ, pk)): On input of message M of binary length
m, a signature σ and a public verification key pk, the verification algorithm first
computes the bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ` as described above. Then it does the following compari-
son:
(pk1, . . . , pk`)
?
= (Eb1,w−1ck (σ1), . . . , Eb`,w−1ck (σ`))
If the comparison holds, it returns true and false otherwise.
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3.2 The Security of Generic W-OTS
In this section we analyze the security of the generic W-OTS description from the
last section. We show that W-OTS is existentially unforgeable under adaptive cho-
sen message attacks if the used function chain is one-deeper preimage resistant.
Furthermore, we show that W-OTS is strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attacks if the function chain is second-origin resistant. More precisely, we
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5. Let n,w,m ∈ N, w,m = poly(n), C a function chain. Denote by
tKg (tSign, tVf) the runtime of the W-OTS key generation (signature, verification)
algorithm, respectively. Then the insecurity of W-OTS against an EU-CMA attack,
InSeceu-cma (W-OTS(1n, w,m); t, 1), is bounded by
InSeceu-cma (W-OTS(1n, w,m); t, 1)
≤ `w · InSecodp (C(1n, w − 1); t′)
with t′ = t+ tKg + tSign + tVf .
Moreover, we can bound InSecsu-cma (W-OTS(1n, w,m); t, 1), the insecurity of
W-OTS against an SU-CMA attack, by
InSecsu-cma (W-OTS(1n, w,m); t, 1)
≤ `w · (InSecodp (C(1n, w − 1); t′) + InSecso (C(1n, w − 1); t′))
with t′ = t+ tKg + tSign + tVf .
The proof of this lemma is rather straight forward. The intuition is that in the
case of EU-CMA security, a forgery must contain a one-deeper preimage for one
of the ` chains. This is guaranteed by the construction of the checksum. In the
reduction we simply guess this chain. In case of SU-CMA security, the forgery
contains either a one-deeper preimage or a second-origin. Again we guess the chain.
Proof. Part 1 - EU-CMA: We begin with the EU-CMA case. For the sake of
contradiction assume there exists an adversary A that can produce existential forg-
eries for W-OTS(1n, w,m) running an adaptive chosen message attack in time t and
with success probability  greater the claimed bound `w · InSecodp (C(1n, w − 1); t′).
We show how to construct an oracle machine MA that breaks the one-deeper
preimage resistance of C(1n, w − 1) in time t′ ≈ t with success probability greater
InSecodp (C(1n, w); t), leading to the required contradiction. A pseudo-code version
of MA is given as Algorithm 3.1.
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Algorithm 3.1:MA
Input: Chain key ck, iteration count i and odp challenge Yc
Output: A one-deeper preimage X ∈ D
1 Run Kg(1n) with w = λ+ 1, using ck as chain key to generate a W-OTS key
pair (sk, pk);
2 Choose α
$←− {1, ..., `};
3 Replace pkα by pk
′
α ←− E i,w−1ck (Yc);
4 Run ASign(sk,·)(pk);
5 if ASign(sk,·)(pk) queries Sign with message M then
6 Compute B = (b1, ..., b`);
7 if bα < i then
8 return fail;
9 else
// Generate signature σ of M
10 Run σ = (σ1, . . . , σ`)←− Sign(M, sk);
11 Set σα = E i,bαck (Yc);
12 Reply to query with σ;
13 end
14 end
15 if ASign(sk,·)(pk) returns valid (σ′,M ′) then
16 compute B′ = (b′1, ..., b
′
`);
17 if b′α ≥ i then
18 return fail;
19 else
20 return Eb′α,bα−1ck (σα);
21 end
22 else
23 return fail;
24 end
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On input of a chain key ck, iteration count i and odp challenge YcMA generates a
W-OTS public key for w = λ+ 1 using ck as chain key. Next,MA selects a random
chain α and places the challenge there. This is done computing the remaining
w − 1 − i iterations to obtain the output of the chain and using it to replace the
value in the public key that corresponds to chain α (Line 3). Please note that the
resulting public key is distributed in the same way as a public key generated by Kg.
The reason is that Yc is the ith intermediate value of a chain. The difference to a
normal key pair is that MA now only knows the intermediate values of chain α for
iterations ≥ i. For the remaining chains, all values are known. For this reason, if A
makes a query to the signing oracle, MA can answer the query correctly if bα ≥ i
(Line 7). In this case,MA computes the signature using the secret key values and Yc
(Lines 10&11). Otherwise it returns fail. Now, if A returns a valid forgery,MA only
learns something new if b′α < i (Line 17). In this case, MA extracts the one-deeper
preimage and returns it (Line 20). Otherwise it returns fail.
Now we computeMA’s success probability. MA succeeds, if the break conditions
on lines 7 and 17 are not fulfilled and A returns a valid forgery. We do the analysis
in the reverse order. By assumption, A succeeds with probability . Because of the
checksum construction, there must exist at least one 1 ≤ j ≤ w−1 with b′j < bj. To
simplify the analysis, we compute the probability that α = j and bα = i, i.e. that
we placed Yc in the perfect position. In this case bα ≥ i and b′α < i and both break
conditions are not fulfilled. This happens with probability ≥ w−1`−1, because we
chose α uniformly at random and bα > 0 must hold. Putting things together we get:
SuccodpC(1n,w−1)
(MA) ≥ 1
w`
· .
The runtime t′ of MA is the runtime t of A plus the time needed to run Kg, Sign
and Vf (t′ = t + tKg + tSign + tVf). Using that  is greater than the claimed bound
leads to the required contradiction.
Part 2 - SU-CMA: Now we turn to the SU-CMA case. For the sake of con-
tradiction assume there exists an adversary A that can produce strong forgeries for
W-OTS(1n, w,m) running an adaptive chosen message attack in time t and with
success probability  greater than the claimed bound `w · (InSecodp (C(1n, w − 1); t′)
+InSecso (C(1n, w − 1); t′)). Then there are two mutually exclusive cases. First, A
might still return a forgery for a new message. In this case we can useMA to break
the odp resistance of C(1n, w− 1). Second, A might return a new signature for the
message sent to Sign before. For this case we can build an oracle machineM′A that
breaks the so resistance of C(1n, w − 1). M′A takes the same inputs (ck, i, Yc) as
MA, except that i now is in the range [0, λ− 1]. It also behaves likeMA up to the
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point when A returns the forgery. At this point M′A returns a second origin σ′α if
Yc 6= σ′α and it returns fail otherwise.
We first analyze the success probability for the two cases. As they are mutually
exclusive, they occur with inverse probabilities. Assume A returns a signature on
a new message under the condition that it succeeds with probability p, then the
success probability of MA is the same as above:
SuccodpC(1n,w−1)
(MA) ≥ p
w`
· .
Now under the condition that A succeeds, it returns a new signature on M with
probability 1 − p. Then bj = b′j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ` and there must exist at least one
σj 6= σ′j. With probability ≥ w−1`−1 it holds that α = j and bα = i as both values
are uniformly random. In this caseM′A can answer the signature query and extract
a second origin. By assumption, A succeeds with probability  and so we get
SuccsoC(1n,w−1)
(M′A) ≥ 1− p
w`
· .
The runtime t′ of M′A is equal to the runtime of MA which is the runtime t of A
plus the time needed to run Kg, Sign and Vf (t′ = t+ tKg + tSign + tVf). Now we can
put the two bounds together and use that MA’s success probability in both cases
is limited by the corresponding insecurity functions. Then we get
 ≤ w` · (InSecodp (C(1n, w − 1); t′) + InSecso (C(1n, w − 1); t′))
which contradicts our initial assumption.
3.3 A Function Chain using Second-Preimage
Resistance
In this section we present the construction of a function chain C+. The presented
function chain C+ is odp and so resistant if the internally used function is second-
preimage resistant, one-way and undetectable, i.e. the output of the function is
pseudorandom. This function chain C+ then directly leads to a W-OTS construction
W-OTS+ that is SU-CMA secure under these conditions. We now first present the
construction for C+. Afterwards we formally define undetectability and prove that
C+ is odp and so resistant.
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3.3.1 The C+ Function Chain
We now describe the function chain C+. For a given security parameter n it uses a
family of functions
Fn : {FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}k} (3.1)
where k = poly(n). The function chain C+ works over domain D = {0, 1}n and has
key space K = {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n×λ. The algorithms are instantiated as follows:
I(1n, λ): On input of the security parameter n in unary and the chain length λ the
initialization algorithm choses a function FK from Fn by choosing a K $←− {0, 1}k
uniformly at random. Next it chooses a vector R = (R1, . . . , Rλ)
$←− {0, 1}n×λ of
λ bit strings, each of length n uniformly at random. We call R the randomization
elements. The algorithm returns ck = (K,R).
E i,jck (X): On input of value X ∈ D, interval 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ λ and chain key ck
the evaluation function works the following way. According to the definition of a
function chain, E returns X if i = j (E i,ick (X) = X). For i < j we define E recursively
by
E i,jck (X) = FK(E i,j−1ck (X)⊕Rj),
i.e. in every round, the function first takes the bitwise xor of the intermediate value
and the corresponding randomization element Rj and evaluates FK on the result
afterwards.
Correctness of C+ directly follows from the construction of E above.
3.3.2 Preliminaries
We now provide two definitions used in this section. In the following we use the
(distinguishing) advantage of an adversary which we now define.
Definition 3.6 (Advantage). Given two distributions X and Y, we define the ad-
vantage AdvX ,Y (A) of an adversary A in distinguishing between these two distribu-
tions as
AdvX ,Y (A) = |Pr [1←− A(X )]− Pr [1←− A(Y)]| .
We now define undetectability. In what follows, we only consider the families Fn
defined in the last section (Equation 3.1). Intuitively, a function family is unde-
tectable if its output can not be distinguished from uniformly random values. This
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is what we require from a pseudorandom generator, which in contrast to Fn has to
be length expanding. Here we define it for length preserving function families.
To define undetectability, assume the following two distributions over {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}k. A sample (U,K) from the first distribution Dud,U is obtained by sampling
U
$←− {0, 1}n and K $←− {0, 1}k uniformly at random from the respective domain.
A sample (U,K) from the second distribution Dud,F is obtained by sampling K $←−
{0, 1}k and then evaluating FK on a uniformly random bit string, i.e. U ←− FK(Un).
The advantage of an adversary A against the undetectability of Fn is then defined
as the distinguishing advantage for these two distributions:
AdvudFn (A) = AdvDud,U ,Dud,F (A)
Using this we define undetectability as:
Definition 3.7 (Undetectability (UD)). Let n ∈ N, t = poly(n), Fn a family of
functions as described above. We call Fn undetectable, if InSecud (Fn; t) the advan-
tage of any adversary A against the undetectability of Fn running in time less or
equal t is negligible in n:
InSecud (Fn; t) def= maxA {Adv
ud
Fn (A)} = negl(n) .
Undetectability was already used by Dods et al. [DSS05] in security proofs for
W-OTS.
3.3.3 Security Proof
We now show that C+ is an odp and so resistant function chain if Fn is a second-
preimage resistant, undetectable one-way function family. More formally we prove
the following lemma:
Lemma 3.8. Let n, λ, t ∈ N, Fn as defined above be a second-preimage resistant,
undetectable one-way function family. Then InSecodp (C+(1n, λ); t), the odp resis-
tance of C+ is bounded by
InSecodp
(C+(1n, λ); t)
≤ λ · InSecud (Fn; t?) + InSecow (Fn; t′) + λ · InSecspr (Fn; t′′)
with t′ = t+λ, t′′ = t+2λ and t? = t+2λ−1. Moreover, if Fn is a second-preimage
resistant function family, InSecso (C+(1n, λ); t), the so resistance of C+ is bounded
by
InSecso
(C+(1n, λ); t) ≤ λ · InSecspr (Fn; t′)
with t′ = t+ 2λ.
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This leads to our first main result. We call W-OTS using C+ as the function chain
W-OTS+. Combining the above result with Lemma 3.5 we obtain the following
theorem on the security of W-OTS+:
Theorem 3.9. Let n,w,m ∈ N, w,m = poly(n), Fn as defined above a second-
preimage resistant, undetectable one-way function family. Then, the insecurity
of W-OTS+ against an EU-CMA attack, InSeceu-cma
(
W-OTS+(1n, w,m); t, 1
)
, is
bounded by
InSeceu-cma
(
W-OTS+(1n, w,m); t, 1
)
≤ `w2 · InSecud (Fn; t?) + `w · InSecow (Fn; t′) + `w2 · InSecspr (Fn; t′′)
with t′ = t+ tKg+ tSign+ tVf +w, t′′ = t+ tKg+ tSign+ tVf +2w and t? = t+ tKg+ tSign+
tVf + 2w − 1. Moreover, the insecurity of W-OTS+ against an SU-CMA attack is
bounded by
InSecsu-cma
(
W-OTS+(1n, w,m); t, 1
)
≤ `w2 · InSecud (Fn; t?) + `w · InSecow (Fn; t′) + (`w2 + w) · InSecspr (Fn; t′′)
with t′ = t + tKg + tSign + tVf + w, t′′ = t + tKg + tSign + tVf + 2w and t? = t + tKg +
tSign + tVf + 2w − 1.
It seems natural to assume that the existence of a function that combines one-
wayness, undetectability and second-preimage resistance is equivalent to the exis-
tence of a one-way function. As the function has to be one-way itself, the one
direction is trivial. On the other hand, we know that second-preimage resistant
functions exist if a one-way function exists [Rom90] and we know the same for un-
detectable functions, i.e. pseudorandom generators [HILL99]. We leave the question
if this also implies the existence of a function family that combines all three proper-
ties for future work. If this was the case, it would mean that W-OTS+ has minimal
security requirements.
Before we present the proof, we now give some intuition. We begin with the odp
resistance. Recall, the adversary is given a chain key, an index i and the output of
the ith iteration Y . Then it has to return a one-deeper preimage X of Y . Intuitively,
if X leads to Y as the output of the ith iteration, it also leads to a real preimage of
Y under FK that we try to extract using the preimage challenge as Y . If X leads
a different value than Y as output for the ith iteration, the values in the chains
starting from Y and X must collide at some point, as they lead the same final
output. This also means a collision for FK . By manipulating the randomization
elements in the chain key, we can use this second case to extract a second-preimage
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with high probability. The undetectability is used to show that the adversary still
succeeds with sufficiently high probability although the Y is not an output of the
ith iteration of the chain but a uniformly random value.
For the case of so resistance, we proceed similar to the above, but we know in
advance that only the second case can appear. For this reason, we do not have to
place a preimage challenge in the chain and can use a Y that is really the output
of the ith iteration of the chain. Hence, we also do not need the undetectability in
this case.
Proof of Lemma 3.8.
Part 1 - SO resistance: We first prove the so case, as we can reuse the re-
duction for the odp case. For the sake of contradiction assume there exists an
adversary A that can break the so resistance of C+(1n, λ) running in time ≤ t and
with success probability A = SuccsoC+(1n,λ) (A) greater than the claimed bound on
InSecso (C+(1n, λ); t). We first show how to construct an oracle machine MAspr that
breaks the second-preimage resistance of Fn using A. A pseudo-code description of
MAspr is given as Algorithm 3.2.
Algorithm 3.2:MAspr
Input: Security parameter n, function key K, second-preimage resistance
challenge Xc.
Output: A value X that is a second-preimage for Xc under FK or fail.
1 Sample R
$←− {0, 1}n×λ to obtain a chain key ck = (K,R) for length λ;
2 Choose index α
$←− {0, . . . , λ− 1} uniformly at random;
3 Sample U
$←− {0, 1}n and compute Y ←− Eαck(U);
4 Choose index β
$←− {α + 1, . . . , λ} uniformly at random;
5 Obtain R′ from R, replacing Rβ by Eα,β−1ck (Y )⊕Xc ;
6 Set ck′ = (K,R′);
7 Run Y ′ ←− A(ck′, α, Y ) ;
8 if Y ′ 6= Y and Eα,λck (Y ′) = Eα,λck (Y ) then
9 if X ′ = Eα,β−1ck (Y ′)⊕Rβ 6= Xc and FK(X ′) = Eα,βck (Y ) = FK(Xc) then
10 return second-preimage X ′ ;
11 end
12 end
13 return fail;
The oracle machine MAspr first imitates the initialization algorithm to obtain a
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valid chain key ck = (K,R) for length λ using the given function key K. Then,
MAspr selects an iteration index α uniformly at random to construct the so challenge.
Next,MAspr samples a uniformly random element U $←− {0, 1}n from the domain of
the function chain and computes the output Y of the αth iteration. Then, another
intermediate value β between α and the end of the chain is selected uniformly at
random. MAspr places the second-preimage challenge at the input to FK during
the βth iteration of the chain, replacing the randomization element Rβ (Line 5).
A manipulated chain key ck′ is constructed using the new set of randomization
elements. Then MAspr runs A on input (ck′, α, Y ).
If A returns a second origin Y ′, MAspr tries to extract a second-preimage. Oth-
erwise, MAspr returns fail. Assume A returned a second origin. In this case the
chains continued from Y and Y ′ must collide at some position between α + 1 and
λ according to the pigeonhole principle as they have the same final output. If they
collide at position β for the first time, a second-preimage for Xc can be extracted
(Line 10). Otherwise MAspr aborts.
Now, we compute the success probability of MAspr. As A’s input distribution is
correct, it will return a second-origin with probability A. MAspr returns a second-
preimage for Xc if the two chains collide for the first time at position β. This
happens with probability greater λ−1 as β was chosen uniformly at random from
within the interval [α + 1, λ].
Using that MAspr’s success probability is limited by the corresponding insecurity
function for the second-preimage resistance of Fn, we can bound the success prob-
ability of A if called by MAspr:
A ≤ λ · InSecspr (Fn; t′) . (3.2)
The time t′ = t + 2λ is an upper bound for the runtime of A plus the time needed
to compute all values for two chains of length ≤ λ. This leads the required contra-
diction.
Part 2 - ODP resistance: We now prove the odp case. For the sake of con-
tradiction assume there exists an adversary A that can break the odp resistance
of C+(1n, λ) running in time ≤ t and with success probability A = SuccodpC+(1n,λ) (A)
greater than the claimed bound on InSecodp (C+(1n, λ); t). If A returns a one-deeper
preimage (j,X) on input (ck, i, Y ) there are two mutually exclusive cases that ap-
pear with complementary probability. Either E j,ick (X) = Y holds, i.e. Y is the ith
intermediate value of the chain continued from X, or it does not hold. Denote the
two cases by c1, i.e. the condition holds, and c2 otherwise. In the following we show
how to construct an oracle machineMAow, that breaks the one-wayness of Fn usingA
3.3 A Function Chain using Second-Preimage Resistance 31
in case c1. A pseudo-code description ofMAow is given as Algorithm 3.3. Otherwise,
in case c2, we can useMAspr from the so proof above to extract a second-preimage.
For this to work, we only have to replace Line 7 of MAspr by
(j,X)←− A(ck′, α, Y );Y ′ ←− E j,αck (X);
i.e. transfer the one-deeper preimage into a second-origin.
Algorithm 3.3:MAow
Input: Security parameter n, function key K, one-way challenge Yc.
Output: A value X that is a preimage of Yc under FK or fail.
1 Sample R
$←− {0, 1}n×λ to obtain a chain key ck = (K,R) for length λ ;
2 Choose index α
$←− {1, . . . , λ} uniformly at random ;
3 Run (X, j)←− A(ck, α, Yc) ;
4 if j < α and Eα,λck (Yc) = E j,λck (X) then
// MAow is used for the case E j,αck (X) = Yc, so the following
always works
5 return preimage E j,α−1ck (X)⊕Rα ;
6 end
7 return fail;
The oracle machine MAow first imitates the initialization algorithm to obtain a
valid chain key ck = (K,R) for length λ using the given function key K. Then,
MAow selects the position to place its challenge in the chain key. Therefor, it samples
an index α uniformly at random to select an intermediate value of this chain. Then
MAow runs A on input (ck, α, Yc), i.e. giving Yc to the adversary as the output of
the αth iteration of the chain. If A returns a one-deeper preimage (j,X),MAow can
always extract a preimage. This holds as MAow is used for the case that A returns
one-deeper preimages that fulfill E j,αck (X) = Yc. In any other case,MAow returns fail.
Now we compute the success probability of MAow conditioned on case c1, i.e. we
assume wheneverA succeeds, it returns a one-deeper preimage that fulfills E j,αck (X) =
Yc. Hence, if A succeeds,MAow returns a preimage of Yc under FK with probability
1. As our modifications might have changed the input distribution of A, it does not
necessarily succeed with probability A. For the moment we denote the probability
that A returns a one-deeper preimage when run by MAow as ′A. Using that MAow’s
success probability against the one-wayness of Fn is bound by the corresponding
insecurity function, we can bound the success probability of A in case c1 if called
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by MAow:
′A ≤ InSecow (Fn; t′) (3.3)
where the time t′ = t + λ is an upper bound for the runtime of A plus the time
needed to compute all values for one chain of length ≤ λ.
As a second step, we bound the difference between the success probability ′A of
A when called byMAow and its success probability A in the original experiment. If
the first is greater than the latter this would already lead a contradiction. Hence,
we assume ′A ≤ A in what follows. Please note, that among A’s inputs only the
distribution of Yc might differ from the distribution in the real game. We define
two distributions DM and Dodp over {0, . . . , λ} × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}(n×λ) × {0, 1}k. A
sample (α, U,R, K) followsDM if the entries α $←− {0, . . . , λ}, U $←− {0, 1}n, R $←−
{0, 1}n×λ and K $←− {0, 1}k are chosen uniformly at random. A sample (α, U,R, K)
follows Dodp if α, R and K are chosen uniformly at random but U = Eαck(Un) with
ck = (K,R). Thus, the two distributions only differ in the way U is chosen. We
now construct an oracle machine M′A that uses the possibly different behavior of
A when given differently distributed inputs to distinguish between Dodp and DM.
UsingM′A we can then upper bound A by a function of the distinguishing advantage
of M′A and ′A. Afterwards we use a hybrid argument to bound the distinguishing
advantage of M′A using the undetectability of Fn.
The oracle machineM′A works the following way. On input of a sample (α, U,R,
K) that is either chosen from DM or from Dodp, M′A runs A on input (ck, α, U)
with ck = (K,R). Whenever A returns a valid one-deeper preimage,M′A returns 1
and 0 otherwise. The runtime ofM′A is bounded by the runtime of A plus no more
than λ evaluations of E . So we get t′′ = t+ λ as an upper bound.
Now, we compute the distinguishing advantage AdvDM,Dodp
(M′A) ofM′A. If the
sample is taken from DM, the distribution of A’s inputs generated by M′A is the
same as the distribution of the inputs generated by MAow. Hence, M′A outputs 1
with probability
Pr
[
(α, U,R, K)←− DM : 1←−M′A(α, U,R, K)
]
= ′A.
If the sample was taken from Dodp, A’s inputs generated byM′A follow the same
distribution as those in the odp game and so M′A outputs 1 with probability
Pr
[
(α, U,R, K)←− Dodp : 1←−M′A(α, U,R, K)
]
= A.
Hence, the distinguishing advantage of M′A is
AdvDodp,DM
(M′A) = |A − ′A| .
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As mentioned above, we only have to consider the case A ≥ ′A. Therefore, we
obtain the following bound on A:
A = AdvDodp,DM
(M′A)+ ′A (3.4)
In our last step, we limit the distinguishing advantage of M′A. We use a hybrid
argument to show that this advantage is bound by the undetectability of Fn. For a
given α ∈ {0, . . . , λ}, we define the hybrids
Hj = (α, E j,αck (Un),R, K),
with R
$←− {0, 1}n×λ, K $←− {0, 1}k for 0 ≤ j ≤ α. Given an adversary B that
can distinguish between H0 and Hα with advantage B, a hybrid argument yields
that there must exist two consecutive hybrids that B distinguishes with advantage
≥ B/α. Assume these two hybrids are Hγ and Hγ+1. Then we can construct
an oracle machine MBud that uses B to distinguish between Dud,U and Dud,F as
defined in the preliminaries and thereby attacking the undetectability of Fn. Given
a distinguishing challenge (U,K), MBud selects R $←− {0, 1}n×λ, sets ck = (K,R),
computes X = Eγ+1,αck (U), runs b←− B(α,X,R, K) and outputs b.
Let’s analyze the advantage AdvudFn
(MBud) of MBud. If the sample is taken from
Dud,U , U is uniformly random and X = Eγ+1,αck (U) is distributed exactly like the
second element of Hγ+1. Otherwise, if the sample is taken from Dud,F , then U ←−
FK(Un) is an output of FK and we get
X = Eγ+1,αck (FK(Un)) = Eγ,αck (Un ⊕Rγ+1)
= Eγ,αck (Un) = Hγ(2)
where Hγ(2) denotes the second element of Hγ. Here we used the fact, that the
xor of a uniformly distributed variable and a fixed value leads again to a uniformly
distributed variable. Summing up, the input of B, produced by MBud is either dis-
tributed like Hγ or like Hγ+1, depending onMBud’s distinguishing challenge. Hence,
the advantage ofMBud is exactly that of B distinguishing between these two hybrids.
Thus, we get
AdvudFn
(MBud) ≥ B/α.
As the advantage of MBud is bounded by the undetectability of Fn per assumption,
M′A does exactly what we assume B to do and the runtime of MBud is that of B
plus at most λ evaluations of E , we get
InSecud (Fn; t?) ≥ AdvudFn
(MBud) ≥ Bα = AdvDodp,DM
(M′A)
α
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where t? = t′′ + λ − 1 = t + 2λ − 1 is the runtime of MBud. As α ∈ {0, . . . , λ}, we
obtain the following bound on the advantage of M′A:
AdvDodp,DM
(M′A) ≤ λ · InSecud (Fn; t?) . (3.5)
Putting equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) together we obtain a final bound on A
for case c1:
A ≤ λ · InSecud (Fn; t?) + InSecow (Fn; t′)
with t′ = t+ λ and t? = t+ 2λ− 1.
The success probability of MAspr conditioned on case c2 is exactly the bound
from the so resistance proof, because case c2 implies that the returned one-deeper
preimage leads directly to a second origin. So, we get for case c2
A ≤ λ · InSecspr (Fn; t′′)
where the time t′′ = t + 2λ is an upper bound for the runtime of A plus the time
needed to compute all values for two chains of length ≤ λ.
As the two cases are mutually exclusive and the probabilities that they occur add
up to 1, we can apply a union bound and get
A ≤ λ · InSecud (Fn; t?) + InSecow (Fn; t′) + λ · InSecspr (Fn; t′′)
with t′ = t + λ, t′′ = t + 2λ and t? = t + 2λ − 1. This contradicts the initial
assumption
3.4 A Function Chain using Pseudorandom Function
Families
In this section we present C$, a function chain that is odp resistant if the used func-
tion family is pseudorandom. Using this function chain we obtain a W-OTS variant
W-OTS$ that is EU-CMA secure if the used function family is pseudorandom. As
the existence of pseudorandom function families is known to be equivalent to the
existence of a one-way function [HILL99, GGM86], this means that W-OTS$ has
minimal security assumptions. We first present the function chain C$. Afterwards
we state some preliminaries to finally prove C$ to be odp resistant.
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3.4.1 The C$ Function Chain
We now describe the function chain C$. For a given security parameter n it uses a
family of functions
Fn = {FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n} (3.6)
parameterized by a key K ∈ {0, 1}n and a security parameter n. The function
chain C$ works over domain and key space D = K = {0, 1}n. The algorithms are
instantiated as follows:
I(1n, λ): On input of the security parameter n in unary and the chain length λ
the initialization algorithm choses a value R
$←− {0, 1}n uniformly at random and
returns ck = R. We assume that λ is publicly known.
E i,jck (X): On input of value X ∈ D, interval 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ λ and chain key ck
the evaluation function works the following way. According to the definition of a
function chain, E returns X if i = j (E i,ick (X) = X). For i < j we define E recursively
by
E i,jck (X) = FEi,j−1ck (X)(R),
i.e. in every round, the output of the previous round is used to select a function
from Fn which then is evaluated on input R. One might think of it as a random
walk through the function family starting from X.
Correctness follows immediately from the iterative nature of the evaluation algo-
rithm.
3.4.2 Preliminaries
In the following we define a new security notion for function families required for
our reduction. We call the notion key one-wayness (kow) which states that it is
hard to find a key K such that the function FK maps a given input X to a given
output Y . We also state two lemmas about the relation between this notion and
the pseudorandomness property, which will be useful for the security proof.
Towards defining kow, we define the success probability of an adversaryA against
the key one-wayness of a function family Fn as
SucckowFn (A) = Pr
[
(X,K)
$←− {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, Y ← FK(X),
K ′ ←− A(X, Y ) : Y = FK′(X)
]
.
Based on this we can define kow:
36 3 New Variants of the Winternitz One Time Signature Scheme
Definition 3.10 (Key One-Wayness (kow)). Let n, t ∈ N, t = poly(n), Fn be a
family of functions as in (3.6). We call Fn kow, if InSeckow (Fn; t), the success
probability of any adversary A that runs in time at most t, is negligible in n:
InSeckow (Fn; t) def= maxA
{
SucckowFn (A)
}
= negl(n) .
A key collision of a function family Fn is defined as a pair of distinct keys (K,K ′)
such that FK(X) = FK′(X) holds for some X ∈ {0, 1}n. In our proofs we make use
of an upper (κ) and a lower (κ′) bound on the number of key collisions that occur
in the family Fn. We define these bounds as follows:
Definition 3.11. Let Fn be a family of functions as in (3.6). We define the upper
bound on the number of key collisions in Fn as the maximum number of keys that
map the same input value to the same output value:
κ(Fn) def= max
S⊆{0,1}n
{
|S| | (∃X, Y ∈ {0, 1}n), (∀K ∈ S) : FK(X) = Y
}
.
We define the lower bound on the number of key collisions in Fn accordingly as
κ′(Fn) def= min
K′∈{0,1}n
max
S⊆{0,1}n,K′∈S
{
|S| | (∃X, Y ∈ {0, 1}n), (∀K ∈ S) : FK(X) = Y
}
.
Please note that κ, κ′ ≥ 1 per definition. We write κ (κ′) instead of κ(Fn) (κ′(Fn))
where Fn is clear from the context. The values κ and κ′ restrict the number of
different images Y some preimage X can be mapped to by functions in Fn, i.e.
2n
κ
≤ ∣∣ {FK(X) : K ∈ {0, 1}n} ∣∣ ≤ 2n
κ′
(3.7)
for all X ∈ {0, 1}n. Also, given Y $←− {0, 1}n the probability that there exists a key
K and preimage X such that FK(X) = Y holds is at least 1/κ.
To make our security proof meaningful we will need a bound on κ. The following
lemma states a relation between κ and the insecurity of a pseudorandom function
family. Please recall, that the time t is counted in terms of evaluations of F. We
assume, that a call to the oracle Box in the prf game takes the same time as an
evaluation of F.
Lemma 3.12. Let b, n ∈ N, b ≤ n, Fn as in (3.6) be a prf with insecurity function
InSecprf (Fn; t) ≤ t
2b
and κ(Fn) as in Definition 3.11. Then
κ(Fn) ≤ 2n−b + 1.
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Proof. Assume κ > 2n−b+1 and let (X, Y ) be a pair where there exist κ keys mapping
X to Y . We show how to build an adversary A against the pseudorandomness of
Fn. First, A queries Box with X. If Box(X) = Y then A returns 1 and 0 otherwise.
Clearly A runs in time t = 1. Furthermore, we have Pr[Box $←− Fn : ABox(·) =
1] = κ/2n > 2−b + 2−n and Pr[Box $←− AF : ABox(·) = 1] = 2−n and therefore
SuccprfFn (A) > 2−b which contradicts the assumption on the insecurity of Fn.
Following the definition of κ and κ′, κ′ ≥ 1 always holds. The above lemma implies
that for a good pseudorandom function family, i.e. a pseudorandom function family
with b = n bit security, κ = 2.
The following lemma states that the kow property is implied by the prf property.
In other words, an efficient attacker against the kow property leads to an efficient
attacker against the pseudorandomness.
Proposition 3.13 (prf⇒ kow). Let Fn be a function family as in Equation 3.6.
Then the pseudorandomness and the key one-wayness of Fn are related as follows:
InSeckow (Fn; t) ≤ 11
κ
− 1
2n
· InSecprf (Fn; t+ 2, 2) .
Proof. Assume there exists an adversary A against the key one-wayness of Fn, i.e.
that given a pair (X, Y ) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n finds a key K satisfying Y = FK(X)
in time t with probability  = InSeckow (Fn; t). Then we can construct an oracle
machine MA against the pseudorandomness of Fn using A the following way: MA
queries Box(·) with a random value X $←− {0, 1}n. After receiving the answer Y ,
MA runs K ←− A(X, Y ) to obtain a key K. Then MA queries Box with a second
random value X ′ $←− {0, 1}n. MA returns 1 if Box(X ′) = Y ′ = FK(X ′) and 0
otherwise.
We now analyze the success probability of MA. In case Box $←− Fn, the proba-
bility that A outputs a key K such that FK(X) = Y holds is  per assumption. The
probability that Box(X ′) = Y ′ = FK(X ′) holds is at least 1/κ, because at least one of
the κ functions in Fn mappingX to Y also mapsX ′ to Y ′. In case Box $←− AF(n, n),
the probability that A outputs a key K such that FK(X) = Y holds is at most .
The probability that Box(X ′) = Y ′ = FK(X ′) holds is 1/2n, because from the
2n(2
n−1) functions in AF(n, n) mapping X to Y , only 2n(2n−2) also map X ′ to Y ′. In
summary we get InSecprf (Fn; t+ 2, 2) ≥ SuccprfFn
(MA) ≥  (1/κ− 1/2n) .
3.4.3 Security Proof
We now proof that C$ is an odp resistant function chain, if Fn is a pseudorandom
function family. More specifically, we prove the following lemma:
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Lemma 3.14. Let n, λ, t ∈ N, Fn as in Equation (3.6) a pseudorandom function
family. Then, InSecodp
(C$(1n, λ); t), the odp resistance of C$ is bounded by
InSecodp
(C$(1n, λ); t) ≤ κ(Fn)λ(
1
κ(Fn) − 12n
) · InSecprf (Fn; t′, 2)
with t′ = t+ λ+ 2.
This leads to our second main result. We call W-OTS using C$ as function chain
W-OTS$. Combining the above result with Lemma 3.5 we obtain the following
theorem on the security of W-OTS$:
Theorem 3.15. Let n,w,m, t ∈ N, w,m = poly(n), Fn as in Equation (3.6) a pseu-
dorandom function family. Then, the insecurity of W-OTS$ against an EU-CMA
attack, InSeceu-cma
(
W-OTS$(1n, w,m); t, 1
)
, is bounded by
InSeceu-cma
(
W-OTS$(1n, w,m); t, 1
)
≤ `wκ(Fn)w−1 1(
1
κ(Fn) − 12n
) · InSecprf (Fn; t′, 2)
with t′ = t+ tKg + tSign + tVf + w + 1.
The intuition behind the proof is that a one-deeper preimage for challenge (ck, i, Y )
will lead a function key for Fn used in iteration i − 1. Using a combinatorial ar-
gument, this key maps R to Y with high enough probability. Thus, we can use
an adversary against the odp resistance of C$ to construct a kow adversary. Us-
ing Proposition 3.13 we can limit the maximum success probability of this kow
adversary by the insecurity of the pseudorandomness of Fn.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction assume there exists an adversary A that can
break the odp resistance of C$(1n, λ) running in time ≤ t and with success probabil-
ity A = SuccodpC+(1n,λ) (A) greater than the claimed bound on InSecodp
(C$(1n, λ); t).
We first show how to construct an oracle machine MA that breaks the key one-
wayness of Fn using A. A pseudo-code description ofMA is given as Algorithm 3.4.
The goal ofMA is to produce a key K such that FK(Xc) = Yc for Xc, Yc provided
as input. First, MA sets Xc to be the chain key. Then MA chooses a random
index α within the range [1, . . . , λ] using the uniform distribution. Next, MA calls
A(ck, α, Yc) claiming that Yc is an αth intermediate value of the chain (Line 3).
If A returns a one-deeper preimage (j,X ′), MA computes a candidate key K ←
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Algorithm 3.4:MA
Input: Security parameter n, kow challenge (Xc, Yc) as in Definition 3.10
Output: K, such that FK(Xc) = Yc or fail
1 Set ck = Xc;
2 Choose index α ∈ [1, . . . , λ] uniformly at random;
3 Run (j,X ′)←− A(ck, α, Yc);
4 if j < α and Eα,λck (Yc) = E j,λck (X ′) then
5 Compute K ← E j,α−1ck (X ′);
6 if FK(X) 6= Y then
7 return fail;
8 end
9 return K;
10 end
11 return fail;
E j,α−1ck (X ′) as the output of iteration α − 1, continuing the chain from X ′. Then,
MA checks whether FK(X) = Yc holds (Line 6). If the condition holds,MA returns
the key K. Otherwise MA returns fail.
We now compute the success probability ofMA. The probability that A succeeds
in Line 3 is at least A by definition. This probability holds under the condition that
Yc resembles a regular output of the αth iteration of the chain under ck. This is the
case if there exists a value W such that Eαck(W ) = Yc. This happens with probability
at least 1/κα according to Definition 3.11. The probability that Yc = FK(X) holds
in Line 6 is at least 1/κλ−α. This is because there exist at most κλ−α different values
that are mapped to Eα,λck (Yc) after λ − α iterations of the chain and at least one of
them is Yc.
In summary we have SucckowFn
(MA) ≥ A/(κακλ−α) = A/(κλ) and MA runs in
time t′ ≤ t+ λ as MA has to compute λ intermediate values of the chain, at most.
We can use Proposition 3.13 and the pseudorandomness of Fn to limitMA’s success
probability:
InSecprf (Fn; t′′, 2) ≥ A(1/κ− 1/2n)/(κλ)
with t′′ = t+ λ+ 2 which states the required contradiction.

4 XMSS
In this chapter we present our main construction: An efficient forward secure sig-
nature scheme using minimal security assumptions. We call the scheme eXtended
Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS). The section is structured as follows. First, we
give a description of an EU-CMA secure construction in Section 4.1 and prove its
security in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we show how to change the construction to
achieve forward security and give a proof that this property is indeed achieved. We
finally analyze the theoretical performance of the scheme in Section 4.4, presenting
theoretical runtimes and sizes. The contributions of this chapter were published as
parts of [2].
4.1 The eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme XMSS
In this section we describe the basic construction of XMSS. This construction
achieves standard security. The forward secure version differs only in few details.
The construction is based on the concept of a Merkle signature scheme, as described
in Section 2.2.2. To minimize storage requirements, pseudorandom key generation is
used to generate the OTS secret keys on the fly. As OTS we use one of our W-OTS
constructions. In the following we describe the scheme for the case of W-OTS$. We
explicitly comment on differences that occur using W-OTS+ in the end. However,
whenever a description holds for W-OTS in general, we write W-OTS. Only if some-
thing is specific for using W-OTS$ we explicitly write W-OTS$. As tree traversal
algorithm we use the BDS algorithm from Section 2.2.3. We start the description
with the parameters used by XMSS, afterwards we give a description of the building
blocks, namely the XMSS Tree, the leaf construction, and the pseudorandom key
generation. Then we describe the algorithms for key generation, signature genera-
tion and verification.
Parameters. For security parameter n ∈ N, XMSS uses a function family Fn =
{FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n}, and a hash function H, chosen uniformly
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Figure 4.1: The XMSS tree construction
at random from the family Hn = {HK : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n}. It is
parameterized by the binary message length m ∈ N, the tree height h ∈ N, the BDS
parameter k ∈ N, k < h, k− h is even, and the Winternitz parameter w ∈ N, w > 1.
XMSS can be used to sign 2h messages of m bits. Those parameters are publicly
known.
XMSS Tree. The XMSS tree is a modification of the classical Merkle Hash Tree
proposed in [DOTV08]. Figure 4.1 shows the construction. The XMSS tree is a
binary tree of height h that makes use of the hash function H. It has h + 1 levels.
The leaves are on level 0. The root is on level h. The nodes on level j, 0 ≤ j ≤ h,
are denoted by Ni,j, 0 ≤ i < 2h−j. To construct the tree, h bit masks Qj ∈ {0, 1}2n,
0 < j ≤ h, are used. Ni,j, for 0 < j ≤ h, is computed as
Ni,j = H((N2i,j−1||N2i+1,j−1)⊕Qj).
The usage of the bitmasks is the main difference to the other Merkle tree construc-
tions. It is borrowed from [BR97] and allows to replace the collision resistant hash
function family by a second-preimage resistant one.
Leaf Construction. The leaves of the XMSS tree are the hash values of the W-OTS
public keys. More specifically, they are the hash values of (pk1, . . . , pk`). The chain
key ck = pk0 becomes part of the XMSS public key. To avoid the need of a collision
resistant hash function, another XMSS tree is used to construct the leaves. It is
called L-tree. The ` leaves of an L-tree are the ` bit strings (pk1, . . . , pk`) from the
corresponding verification key. As ` is not necessarily a power of 2, there might not
be sufficiently many leaves to get a complete binary tree. Therefore the construction
is modified. A left node that has no right sibling is lifted to a higher level of the
L-tree until it becomes the right sibling of another node. In this construction, the
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same hash function H as above but new bitmasks are used. The bitmasks are the
same for all L-trees. As L-trees have height dlog `e, additional dlog `e bitmasks are
required.
Pseudorandom Key Generation. To reduce the secret key size, the W-OTS key
pairs are generated using pseudorandom generators (PRG). The way this is done is
the difference between the EU-CMA and the forward-secure XMSS construction.
For the EU-CMA secure construction, the pseudorandom key generation allows to
reduce the secret key size from 2h W-OTS secret keys of `n bits each to a single n
bit seed value (ignoring the BDS state).
The W-OTS secret keys are computed using a seed Seed ∈ {0, 1}n, the pseu-
dorandom function family Fn, and the pseudorandom generator GEN which for
λ ∈ N, µ ∈ {0, 1}n yields
GENλ(µ) = Fµ(1)|| . . . ||Fµ(λ).
For i ∈ {1, . . . , 2h} the i-th W-OTS secret key is computed as
ski ←− GEN`(FSeed(i)).
Key Generation Algorithm. The key generation algorithm takes as input all of
the above parameters. Then the whole XMSS Tree has to be constructed to obtain
the value of the root node. We now detail this procedure. First, the bitmasks
(Q1, . . . , Qh+dlog `e) and the value R for the W-OTS$ chain key are chosen uniformly
at random. Then, Seed is chosen uniformly at random and it is stored as part
of the secret key SK. The tree is constructed using the TreeHash algorithm,
described in Section 2.2.3. The method LeafCalc to compute the leafs of the
tree is implemented the following way. Given index φ, the W-OTS secret key skφ is
generated as skφ ←− GEN`(FSeed(φ)). Next, the W-OTS key generation is used to
compute the W-OTS public key, which in turn is used to compute the corresponding
leaf using an L-tree. In the end, the W-OTS key pair is deleted. After all 2h leaves
were processed by TreeHash, the only value on Stack is the root of the tree, which
is stored in the public key PK.
During root computation, the BDS state StateBDS is initialized. The initial XMSS
secret key is SK = (Seed, StateBDS). The XMSS public key consists of the bitmasks
(Q1, . . . , Qh+dlog `e), the value X, and the root of the tree.
Signature Generation Algorithm. The signature generation algorithm takes as
input a message M of binary length m, the secret key SK and the index i. It
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outputs an updated secret key SK′ and a signature Σ on the message M . To sign
the ith message (we start counting from 0), the ith W-OTS key pair is used. The
signature Σ = (i, σ,Auth) contains the index i, the W-OTS signature σ, and the
authentication path for the leaf N0,i. We now explain how a signature is generated.
On input of the ith message, the ith W-OTS secret key ski is pseudorandomly
generated as described above. Next, ski is used to generate the one-time signature
σ on M . Then the authentication path is computed using BDS, which results in a
changed State′BDS. The updated secret key SK
′ contains Seed and State′BDS.
Signature Verification Algorithm. The signature verification algorithm takes as
input a signature Σ = (i, σ,Auth), a message M ∈ {0, 1}m and the XMSS public key
PK. To verify the signature, the values B = (b1, . . . , b`) are computed as described
in the W-OTS signature generation, using M . Then the ith verification key is
computed as in W-OTS signature verification:
(pk1, . . . , pk`) = (Eb1,w−1(σ1), . . . , Eb`,w−1(σ`)).
The corresponding leaf N0,i of the XMSS tree is constructed using an L-tree. This
leaf and the authentication path are used to compute the path (P0, . . . , Ph) to the
root of the XMSS tree, where P0 = N0,i and
Pj =
{
H((Pj−1||Authj−1)⊕Bj), if bi/2jc ≡ 0 mod 2
H((Authj−1||Pj−1)⊕Bj), if bi/2jc ≡ 1 mod 2
for 0 ≤ j ≤ h. If Ph is equal to the root of the XMSS tree given in the public key,
the signature is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected.
Using W-OTS+. As mentioned above, things slightly change when we use W-OTS+
instead of W-OTS$. However, there are only three differences. First, we need an-
other function F′ randomly chosen from a family F ′n : {FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈
{0, 1}k} as described in Section 3.3 using the uniform distribution. Second, the
W-OTS algorithms use the C+ algorithms instead of the C$ algorithms. Third, the
public key changes. As we assume F′ to be publicly known, we do not have to
store the corresponding key but we need the w − 1 randomization elements R. We
can reuse the bitmasks that are already part of the secret key. As the bitmasks
are bit strings of length 2n, this works fine if w − 1 ≤ 2(h + dlog `e). Otherwise,
we reuse the bit masks for the first 2(h + dlog `e) randomization elements and add
w − 1− 2(h+ dlog `e) uniformly random bit strings to the public key.
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4.2 Standard Security
In this section we prove that XMSS as described in the last section achievesEU-CMA
security in the standard model and discuss the minimality of the assumptions we
use. We first provide the needed preliminaries.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
We now present some security notions that we need for our proofs. We defined
signature schemes and EU-CMA security in Section 2.1.2. Here we extend this
definitions to the case of key evolving signature schemes. This is required to formally
cover MSS type signature schemes. We also recall the notion of a pseudorandom
generator. Please note that in our proofs we measure algorithmic runtimes as the
number of evaluations of functions from Fn and Hn.
Key Evolving Signature Schemes XMSS is a stateful signature scheme. This is
not covered by the standard definition of digital signature schemes. To capture this
formally we follow the definition from [BM99] of key evolving signature schemes.
In a key evolving signature scheme, the lifetime of a keypair is divided into several
time periods, say p. While the public key pk is fixed, the scheme operates on p
different secret keys sk0, . . . , skp−1, one per time period. A key evolving signature
scheme contains a key update algorithm that is called at the end of each time period
and updates the secret key. The end of a time period might be determined by time,
i.e. a period is one day or something else, like the maximum number of signatures
a secret key can be used for. The latter is the case for XMSS, where a period
ends after signing one message and the key update algorithm is automatically called
after each signature generation. In contrast to an ordinary signature scheme, the
key generation algorithm of a key evolving signature scheme takes as an additional
input the maximal number of periods p and outputs the public key pk and the
first secret key sk0. Using a key evolving signature scheme, a signature (σ, i) on a
message contains the index i of the period of the used secret key. The validation of
a signature (σ, i) only succeeds, if the signature is a valid signature for time period
i under public key pk. We summarize this in the following more formal definition.
Definition 4.1 (Key Evolving Signature Scheme). A key evolving signature scheme
is a quadruple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Kes = (Kg, KUpd, Sign,
Vf). It is parameterized by a security parameter n ∈ N and the number of time
periods p ∈ N, p = poly(n) and operates on the following finite sets with description
length polynomial in n: The secret key space KS = KS0× . . .×KSp−1 consisting of
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p sets, the public key space KP, the message space M, and the signature space Σ.
The runtime of the algorithms is polynomial in n and the algorithms are defined as
follows:
Kg(1n, p): The key generation algorithm on input of the security parameter
n ∈ N in unary and the number of time periods p ∈ N outputs an initial
private signing key sk0 ∈ KS0 and a public verification key pk ∈ KP.
KUpd(sk, i): The key update algorithm on input of an index i ∈ N and a secret
signing key sk ∈ KS outputs the private signing key sk′ ∈ KS i+1 for the next
time period if i < p− 1 and sk ∈ KS i. If i ≥ p− 1 it outputs the empty string.
In all other cases it returns fail.
Sign(sk,M, i): The signature algorithm on input of a signature key sk ∈ KS,
a message M ∈M, and an index i ∈ N outputs the signature (σ, i) ∈ Σ of the
message M if i < T and sk ∈ KS i. It returns fail, otherwise.
Vf(pk,M, (σ, i)): The verification algorithm on input of a public key pk ∈ KP,
a message M ∈ M, and a signature (σ, i) ∈ Σ outputs 1 iff (σ, i) is a valid
signature on M under public key pk for time period i and 0 otherwise.
Now, let KUpd(sk0)
i = KUpd(. . .KUpd(sk0, 0) . . . , i − 1) denote the computation of
the key for time period i starting from sk0. The following condition must hold: For all
M ∈ M, (pk, sk0) ←− Kg(1n, p), and i < p: Vf(M, (Sign(M,KUpd(sk0)i), i), pk) =
1.
A digital signature scheme (Dss) is a key evolving signature scheme with only one
period and a key update algorithm that always returns the empty string. XMSS
is a key evolving signature scheme with p = 2h for h ∈ N. The XMSS key up-
date algorithm consists of increasing the index i in the secret key and running the
BDS algorithm to prepare the next authentication path. This is done after every
signature.
The standard security model for digital signature schemes is existential unforge-
ability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) as described in Section
2.1.2. We translate it to the setting of key evolving signature schemes, using the
following experiment. Let Kes(1n, p) denote a key evolving signature scheme with
security parameter n and number of periods p. The experiment has two phases.
During the chosen message attack phase (cma), the adversary is allowed to collect
signatures on messages of her choice like in the EU-CMA model. In contrast to
the EU-CMA model, the adversary might do this up to p times, once for each time
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period. The adversary algorithm A is given oracle access to an instance of a signa-
ture oracle Sign initialized with secret key ski and index i, denoted by ASign(ski,·,i).
Afterwards, in the forgery phase (forge), the adversary has to come up with an
existential forgery like in the EU-CMA model. The state variable allows the ad-
versary to keep a state and the out variable allows the adversary to switch from the
cma to the forge phase.
Experiment ExpEU-CMAKes(1n,p)(A)
i←− 0, state←− null, out←− null, (sk0, pk)←− Kg(1n, p)
While i < p And out 6= halt
(out, state)←− ASign(ski,·,i)(1n, cma, pk, state)
i++; ski ←− KUpd(ski−1, i)
(M?, σ?, i?)←− A(1n, forge, state)
Return 1 iff Vf(pk,M?, (σ?, i?)) = 1
And Sign was not queried for a signature on M?
For the success probability of an adversary A in the above experiment we write
Succeu-cmaKes(1n,p) (A) = Pr
[
ExpEU-CMAKes(1n,p)(A) = 1
]
.
When we talk about the runtime of an adversary A in the above experiment, it
refers to the sum of runtimes over all executions of A in the experiment. Now we
can define EU-CMA security for key evolving signature schemes.
Definition 4.2 (EU-CMA for Kes). Let n, q ∈ N, t, q = poly(n), Kes a key evolv-
ing signature scheme. Fix p ∈ N. We call Kes EU-CMA-secure, if the maximum
success probability InSeceu-cma (Kes(1n, T ); t, q) of all possibly probabilistic adver-
saries A, running in time ≤ t, making at most q queries to each instance of Sign in
the above experiment, is negligible in n:
InSeceu-cma (Kes(1n, T ); t, q)
def
= max
A
{Succeu-cmaKes(1n,T ) (A)} = negl(n) .
Please note that for a Dss this translates to the initial notion again.
Pseudorandom Generators Pseudorandom generators (PRG) are functions that
stretch a random input to a longer pseudorandom output. We follow the notion of
[BY03]: Let n ∈ N, b = poly(n), b > n, Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}b and A an adversary
that given a b-bit string returns a bit. The notion is defined using the two following
experiments, one where A gets a random string as input and another one where the
input of A is an output of the PRG:
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Experiment Expprg−1Gn (A)
X
$←− {0, 1}n;C ←− Gn(X)
g ←− A(C)
Return g
Experiment Expprg−0Gn (A)
C
$←− {0, 1}b
g ←− A(C)
Return g
The success probability of an adversary A against the security of PRG Gn is defined
as the ability of the adversary to distinguish both experiments:
SuccprgGn (A) =
∣∣Pr [Expprg−1Gn (A) = 1]− Pr [Expprg−0Gn (A) = 1]∣∣ .
Now we define secure pseudorandom generators.
Definition 4.3 (prg). Let n, t ∈ N, t = poly(n), Gn as above. We call Gn a secure
pseudorandom generator, if InSecprg (Gn; t), the maximum success probability of all
possibly probabilistic adversaries A, running in time ≤ t, is negligible in n:
InSecprg (Gn; t)
def
= max
A
{SuccprgGn (A)} = negl(n) .
4.2.2 XMSS is Existentially Unforgeable under Chosen Message
Attacks
In the following, we prove XMSS EU-CMA secure in the standard model and
discuss some implications of this result. We prove the following theorem for XMSS
when using W-OTS$:
Theorem 4.4. If Hn is a second-preimage resistant hash function family and Fn a
pseudorandom function family, then XMSS is existentially unforgeable under adap-
tive chosen message attacks.
Before we give the proof of Theorem 4.4, we want to highlight one implication
of this result: The security assumptions of XMSS are minimal. From [Rom90] it
is known that the minimal security assumption for complexity based cryptography,
namely the existence of a one-way function, is the necessary condition for the exis-
tence of a secure digital signature scheme. As already mentioned in Section 2.1.1, in
[Rom90] the construction of a target-collision resistant hash function family from a
one-way function is presented. Since target-collision resistant hash function families
are second-preimage resistant (see [RS04]), this implies that second-preimage resis-
tant hash function families can be constructed from secure digital signature schemes.
In [HILL99] the construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function
is presented. In [GGM86] pseudorandom function families are obtained from pseu-
dorandom generators. It follows that secure signature schemes yield pseudorandom
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Figure 4.2: Existential relations between primitives. An arrow with a solid line from A
to B says, that B can be constructed from A. A dashed line from A to B says, that a
primitive that fulfills A also fulfills B.
function families. Those constructions imply that there exists a secure instance of
XMSS if there exists any secure digital signature scheme and therefore complexity
based cryptography at all. This implies that the security requirements for XMSS
are minimal. The relations between the primitives are also displayed in Figure 4.2.
Next, we give the proof of Theorem 4.4. The proof uses another view on the
construction of XMSS. Look at XMSS the following way: XMSS uses W-OTS with
pseudorandom key generation. The `n-bit W-OTS secret keys are generated using
GEN and an n-bit (pseudo-)random input. This variant of W-OTS is used with
the XMSS-Tree construction to obtain a many-time signature scheme. The 2h n-bit
inputs for the key generation are again generated using GEN and a random n-bit
string. In our proof we iteratively show that each of these constructions is secure
with the last construction being XMSS.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. First we look at the key generation algorithm Kg in more
detail. Kg uses the PRG GENλ(µ) = Fµ(0)|| . . . ||Fµ(λ − 1) from the last section.
The W-OTS secret key is generated using GEN`(µ) where µ in turn is the ith n-bit
string of the output of GEN2h(Seed). We show that GENλ is a secure PRG if the
used function family is pseudorandom.
Claim 4.5. Let n, λ ∈ N, µ ∈ {0, 1}n, Fn = {FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n}
be a pseudorandom function family with insecurity function InSecprf (Fn; t, q). Then
GENλ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λn,
GENλ(µ) = Fµ(0)|| . . . ||Fµ(λ− 1)
is a PRG with insecurity function
InSecprg (GENλ; t) = InSec
prf (Fn; (t+ λ), λ) .
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Proof of Claim 4.5. For the sake of contradiction assume there exists an adversary
A distinguishing the output of GENλ from a uniformly random λn bit string. Then
we can build an oracle machine MA that given access to A distinguishes Fn from
AF(n, n). MA queries Box with 0, . . . , λ − 1 and hands the concatenation of the
results to A. Then MA simply forwards A’s output. MA succeeds with the same
probability as A.
Now, we show that one can replace the random input of the key generation algo-
rithm by a pseudorandom one. So if we look at W-OTS using GEN`(µ) to generate
the secret key from one n-bit string and assume that µ is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom for the moment, then the following claim tells us, that this is almost as secure
as using `n random bits. Furthermore it tells us, that we can use n random bits
and GEN2h to generate the 2
h bit strings of length n that are used to generate the
2h W-OTS key pairs of XMSS.
Claim 4.6. Let n, n′, q, t, p ∈ N, Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λn be a PRG with insecurity
function InSecprg (Gn; t) that stretches n bit random input to λn bit pseudorandom
output and let Kes = (Kg, KUpd, Sign, Vf) be a key evolving signature scheme
with insecurity function InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
that needs no more than λn
bits of random input for key generation and key update. Further, let Kes? = (Kg?,
KUpd?, Sign, Vf) be the variant of Kes that uses Gn to generate the λn bits required
for key generation. Then Kes? is a key evolving signature scheme with insecurity
function
InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes?(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
= InSecprg (Gn; t
′)+InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
,
where t′ = t+ tKg + p(qtSign + tKUpd?) + tVf .
The intuition behind the proof for the above claim is the following. If the success
probability of an adversary against the scheme with pseudorandom key generation
differs from its success probability against the original scheme, this difference can
only be caused by the pseudorandom key generation. In the proof we show how to
use this difference to distinguish between outputs of the PRG and random strings.
Proof of Claim 4.6. We want to bound the success probability of any adversary A
that runs within time t, making at most q queries to each instance of Sign, i.e. we
want to limit the insecurity function InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes?(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
. Given such
an adversary, we can build an oracle machine MA distinguishing the output of Gn
from random λn bit strings as described in algorithm 4.1.
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We construct MA in the following way. On input of a challenge C ∈ {0, 1}λn,
MA computes a key pair (pk, sk0) for Kes? using C instead of the output of Gn.
Next MA calls ASign=M(1n, cma, pk, state) for each time period i < p or until A
indicates to switch to the forge phase. At the end of each period the key update
algorithm is called using C instead of the output of Gn. If A queries the oracle Sign
for a signature during time period i, MA computes the signature using ski. MA
answers up to q queries per time period. If A returns a valid forgery,MA returns 1
and 0 otherwise. MA runs in time t+ tKg + p(qtSign + tKUpd?) + tVf .
Algorithm 4.1:MA
Input: Security parameter n′ and challenge C ∈ {0, 1}λn′
Output: g ∈ {0, 1}
1 compute (pk, sk)←− Kg(1n′ , p) using C as the randomness of Kg?;
2 out←− null, state←− null, i←− 0;
3 while i < p and out 6= halt do
4 run (out, state)←− ASign=M(1n, cma, pk, state);
5 if A queries Sign in time period i then
6 answer up to q queries using ski
7 end
8 run ski ←− KUpd?(ski, i);
9 i++;
10 end
11 if (M?, σ?, i?)←− A(1n, forge, state) is a valid forgery then
12 return g = 1
13 else
14 return g = 0
15 end
Now we calculate the success probability of MA. If MA is in Expprg−1Gn , C is
pseudorandom output of Gn. Hence, A succeeds with probability SuccEU-CMAKes?(1n′ ,p) (A)
by definition and we get
Pr
[
Expprg−1Gn (MA) = 1
]
= SuccEU-CMA
Kes?(1n′ ,p) (A) .
If MA is in Expprg−0Gn , C is chosen uniformly at random. In this case A suc-
ceeds with probability ≤ InSecEU-CMA (Kes(1n′ , p); t, q). Otherwise A would be
a forger for Kes that running in time t succeeds with probability greater than
52 4 XMSS
InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
, which would contradict the assumption on the secu-
rity of Kes. So we get
Pr
[
Expprg−0Gn (MA) = 1
] ≤ InSecEU-CMA (Kes(1n′ , p); t, q) .
Altogether this leads to
InSecprg (Gn; t
′) ≥ SuccprgGn
(MA)
=
∣∣Pr [Expprg−1Gn (MA) = 1]− Pr [Expprg−0Gn (MA) = 1]∣∣
≥ SuccEU-CMA
Kes?(1n′ ,p) (A)− InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
and therefore
SuccEU-CMA
Kes?(1n′ ,p) (A) ≤ InSecprg (Gn; t′) + InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
with t′ = t+ tKg + p(qtSign + tKUpd?) + tVf . As this holds for any adversary A running
in time ≤ t, making at most q queries to each instance of Sign we get
InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes?(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
≤ InSecprg (Gn; t′) + InSecEU-CMA
(
Kes(1n
′
, p); t, q
)
In [DOTV08] the authors give an exact security proof for an MSS where the
Merkle tree is replaced by the XMSS-Tree construction. Using W-OTS as OTS, we
obtain the following insecurity function for the EU-CMA-security of this XMSS-
Tree construction:
InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS-Tree(1n, 2h); t, q = 1
)
≤ 2 ·max{(2h+log ` − 1)InSecspr (Hn; t′) , 2h · InSecEU-CMA (W-OTS(1n); t′, 1)}
with t′ = t+ 2h · tSign + tVf + tKg.
Now we can combine all this to conclude the proof. We use Claim 4.6 with the
insecurity functions of W-OTS$ and GEN`. This gives us the insecurity function
for W-OTS$ with pseudorandom key generation. We insert this in the insecurity
function for XMSS-Tree. Finally we apply Claim 4.6 again, this time using the
obtained insecurity function for XMSS-Tree with W-OTS with pseudorandom key
4.3 Forward Security 53
generation and GEN2h . Altogether this leads to
InSeceu-cma
(
XMSS(1n, 2h); t, 1
)
≤ InSecprf (Fn; (t′ + 2h), 2h)
+ 2 ·max

(2h+log ` − 1) · InSecspr (Hn; t′) ,
2h
(
InSecprf (Fn; (t′ + `), `)
+ `wκ
w−1
( 1κ− 12n )
· InSecprf (Fn; t′ + w + 1, 2)
)
 (4.1)
where t′ = t+ 2h · tSign + tVf + tKg. This concludes the proof.
4.3 Forward Security
In this section we show that XMSS is forward secure if we slightly modify the key
generation process. Namely, we now use a forward secure PRG to generate the
seeds for the W-OTS keys. This was also used by Krawczyk [Kra00] to reduce the
key size of his generic forward secure signature scheme based on a certification tree.
However, it turns out that the proof becomes much more complicated in our case
as we have to deal with the rather static structure of a hash tree instead of the
dynamic structure of a certification tree. Before we describe the modification and
state our main theorem, we provide the used definitions.
4.3.1 Preliminaries
In the following we define stateful pseudorandom generators and the notion of for-
ward security for these generators, but first we formally define forward secure sig-
nature schemes.
Forward Secure Signature Schemes The notion of forward security is a security
notion for key evolving signature schemes as defined in the last section. We follow
the definition of [BM99]. Again, we define the notion using an experiment which
is given below. This experiment differs only slightly from the one used to define
EU-CMA-security for key evolving signature schemes. The difference is that the
adversary now gets the ability to break in. This means that during the cma phase,
the adversary is allowed to indicate to the experiment that it wants to break in,
setting the out variable to breakin. In this case, the experiment switches from the
cma phase to the forge phase and the adversary is given the secret key ski−1 of the
current time period (Please note that the last two statements in the while loop are
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increasing the index i and updating the secret key. Hence the last key used during
the cma phase has now index i − 1). As an existential forgery for the current or
an upcoming time period would be trivial, the adversary has to come up with an
existential forgery for a past time period.
Experiment ExpFSSIGKes(1n,p)(A)
i←− 0, state←− null, (sk0, pk)←− Kg(1n, p)
While i < p And out 6= breakin
(out, state)←− ASign(ski,·,i)(1n, cma, pk, state)
i++, ski ←− KUpd(ski−1, i)
(M?, σ?, i?)←− A(1n, forge, state, ski−1)
If Vf(pk,M?, (σ?, i?)) = 1, Sign(ski? , ·, i?) was not queried for a signature on M?
And i? < i− 1 Return 1
Return 0
For the success probability of an adversary A in the above experiment we write
SuccfssigKes(1n,p) (A) = Pr
[
ExpFSSIGKes(1n,p)(A) = 1
]
.
When we talk about the runtime of an adversary A in the above experiment, it
refers to the sum of runtimes over all executions of A in the experiment. Now we
can define FSSIG for key evolving signature schemes.
Definition 4.7 (FSSIG). Let n, q ∈ N, t = poly(n), Kes a key evolving signature
scheme. Fix p ∈ N. We call Kes(1n, p) FSSIG-secure, if InSecfssig (Kes(1n, p); t, q),
the maximum success probability of all possibly probabilistic adversaries A, running
in time ≤ t, making at most q queries to each instance of Sign in the above experi-
ment, is negligible in n:
InSecfssig (Kes(1n, p); t, q)
def
= max
A
{SuccfssigKes(1n,p) (A)} = negl(n) .
Note, that forward security defined as above implies EU-CMA-security.
Forward Secure Pseudorandom Bit Generators Informally, a forward secure
PRG is a stateful PRG that starts from a random initial state. Given a state,
it outputs a new state and some output bits. Even if an adversary manages to
learn the secret state of a forward secure PRG, it is unable to distinguish the for-
mer outputs from random bit strings. More formally, a stateful PRG is a function
Gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}b, for n, b ∈ N, b = poly(n), that on input of a state
Statei of length n outputs a new state Statei+1 and b output bits Outi+1. Forward
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security for a stateful PRG that is used to produce no more than n˜ outputs is de-
fined using the two following experiments Expfsprg−1Gn (A) and Expfsprg−0Gn (A) which
are based on the ones from [BY03]. In both experiments the adversary A is allowed
to collect up to n˜ bit strings during the find phase. In the first experiment these
bit strings are outputs of Gn, in the second experiment these bit strings are chosen
uniformly at random. The adversary can keep a history using the variable h. The
adversary can switch to the guess phase setting d = guess. In the guess phase, the
adversary gets the current state of Gn and has to output one bit, indicating wether
the bit strings were uniformly random or generated by Gn:
Experiment Expfsprg−1Gn (A)
State0
$←− {0, 1}n
i←− 0;h, d←− null
Repeat
i←− i+ 1
(Outi, Statei)←− Gn(Statei−1)
(d, h)
$←− A(1n,find,Outi, h)
Until (d = guess) Or (i = n˜)
g
$←− A(1n,guess, Statei, h)
Return g
Experiment Expfsprg−0Gn (A)
State0
$←− {0, 1}n
i←− 0;h, d←− null
Repeat
i←− i+ 1
(Outi, Statei)←− Gn(Statei−1)
Outi
$←− {0, 1}b
(d, h)
$←− A(1n,find,Outi, h)
Until (d = guess) Or (i = n˜)
g
$←− A(1n,guess, Statei, h)
Return g
The success probability of an adversary A is denoted by
SuccfsprgGEN (A) =
∣∣Pr [Expfsprg−1Gn (Dis) = 1]− Pr [Expfsprg−0Gn (Dis) = 1]∣∣ .
When we talk about the runtime of an adversary A in the above experiment, it
refers to the sum of runtimes over all executions of A in the experiment as in the
case of forward secure signature schemes. Now we can define forward security for a
stateful PRG.
Definition 4.8 (FSSIG). Let n, n˜ ∈ N, t = poly(n), Gn a stateful PRG as de-
fined above. We call Gn fsprg-secure, if InSec
fsprg (Gn; t), the maximum success
probability of all possibly probabilistic adversaries A, running in time ≤ t, in the
experiment above, is negligible in n:
InSecfsprg (Gn; t)
def
= max
A
{SuccfsprgGn (A)} = negl(n) .
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4.3.2 XMSS is Forward Secure
In the following we describe the modifications needed to make XMSS forward secure.
Then we state our main theorem and prove it. To make XMSS forward secure we
use a forward secure PRG FsGen when generating the seeds for the W-OTS secret
keys. Starting from a random input Seed = State0 of length n, FsGen uses Fn and
the previous state Statei−1 to generate n bits of pseudorandom output Outi and a
new state Statei of length n:
FsGen(Statei−1) = (Statei||Outi) = (fStatei−1(0)||fStatei−1(1)).
The generation of the W-OTS secret keys from the seeds still utilizes GEN`. The
secret key of the resulting forward secure XMSS contains the current state Statei
instead of Seed. In contrast to the construction from Section 4.1, the seeds for
the W-OTS signature keys are not easily accessible from Statei using one evaluation
of Fn. To compute the authentication path, the tree traversal algorithm needs to
compute several W-OTS keys before they are needed. This is very expensive using
FsGen. Luckily this problem is already addressed in [BDS08]. We use their solution
that requires to store 2h states of FsGen in the secret key.
For XMSS with the modified key generation from above using W-OTS$, we proof
the following security theorem.
Theorem 4.9. If Hn is a second-preimage resistant hash function family and Fn
a pseudorandom function family, then XMSS with the modified key generation de-
scribed above is a forward secure digital signature scheme.
Informally the proof works the following way. First, we state that FsGen is a
forward secure PRG using a result from [BY03]. In a second step, we show that for
arbitrary but fixed h, XMSS is forward secure if the seeds for the W-OTS secret
keys are generated using FsGen. The idea behind the proof is very close to the
one of Claim 4.6. But this time it is more complicated to upper bound the success
probability in the case of random bit strings.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. First, we revisit a result from [BY03] about the security
of FsGen. There the authors show that if Fn is a pseudorandom function family
with insecurity function InSecprf (Fn; t, q), then FsGen is a forward secure PRG
with insecurity function
InSecfsprg (FsGen; t) = 2n˜ · InSecprf (Fn; (t+ 2n˜), 2) .
Now we show that XMSS is forward secure, if the seeds for the W-OTS secret keys
are generated using FsGen.
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Claim 4.10. Let n, n′, h ∈ N, FsGen as described above. Let XMSS ′ be the
version of XMSS where the 2h n′-bit seeds for the W-OTS key generation are chosen
uniformly at random with insecurity function InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS ′1n
′
, 2h); t, q = 1
)
.
Further, let XMSS? be the modified version of XMSS that uses FsGen to generate
the 2h n-bit seeds required for W-OTS key generation. Then XMSS? is a forward
secure signature scheme with insecurity function
InSecFSSIG
(
XMSS?(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
≤ 2h · InSecfsprg (FsGen; t′)
+InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS ′(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
t′ = t+ tKg? + 2htSign + tVf .
Proof of claim. We want to limit the success probability of any adversary A that
tries to break the forward security of XMSS?. More specifically, we want to find an
upper bound for the insecurity function InSecFSSIG
(
XMSS?(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
. Therefore
we assume A runs within time t, making at most 1 query to each instance of Sign.
Given such an adversary, we can build an oracle machine MA distinguishing the
output of FsGen from truly random outputs, given black box access to A.
We construct MA the following way. MA chooses a value α $←− {1, . . . , 2h}
uniformly at random. During the find phase of the fsprg experiment,MA collects
α outputs Out1, . . . ,Outα before switching to the guess phase. In the guess phase
MA is given Stateα. Now, MA uses FsGen and Stateα to compute another 2h − α
outputsOutα+1, . . . ,Out2h . ThenMA usesOut1, . . . ,Out2h instead of the output
of FsGen to generate a XMSS public key pk. Note, that to generate the W-OTS key
pair for time period i, Outi+1 is used. Next MA calls ASign=M(1n, cma, pk, state)
for each time period i < α until A indicates to break in. If A queries MA as the
oracle Sign during period i, MA computes the queried signature using Outi+1 to
generate the corresponding W-OTS secret key. If A indicates to break in during a
time period i 6= α − 1 or does not indicate to break in in time period i = α − 1,
MA returns 0. If A indicates that it wants to break in at time period i = α − 1,
MA runs A in the forge phase with input ski = (Stateα,Outα). This is all secret
information that exists in time period i = α − 1. If A returns a valid forgery for
a time period j < i, then MA returns 1 and 0 otherwise. Altogether MA runs in
time ≤ t′ = t+ tKg? + 2htSign + tVf .
Now we calculate the success probability of MA in distinguishing the output of
FsGen from uniformly random outputs. The probability that A wants to break in
in time period i = α − 1 is at least 2−h as α is chosen uniformly at random. Now,
if MA is run in Expfsprg−1FsGen (MA), the Outi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2h are pseudorandom outputs
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of FsGen. Hence, A succeeds with probability SuccFSSIG
XMSS?(1n′ ,2h) (A) per definition.
As MA returns 1 if A is successful we get
Pr
[
Expfsprg−1FsGen (MA) = 1
]
= 2−h · SuccFSSIG
XMSS?(1n′ ,2h) (A) .
IfMA is in Expfsprg−0FsGen (MA), the Outi, 1 ≤ i ≤ α are chosen uniformly at random.
The remaining Outi, α+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2h are pseudorandom outputs of FsGen. Again,
the probability thatA wants to break in in time period i = α−1 is at least 2−h as α is
chosen uniformly at random. And againMA returns 1 ifA succeeds. We will need an
upper bound for the probability thatMA returns 1. Hence we have to limit A’s suc-
cess probability for the case that A breaks in in time period i = α−1. We will show
that in this case, A succeeds with probability ≤ InSecEU-CMA (XMSS′(1n′ , 2h); t, 1).
For the moment assume this is true. Then we get
Pr
[
Expfsprg−0FsGen (MA) = 1
] ≤ 2−h · InSecEU-CMA (XMSS′(1n′ , 2h); t, 1) .
Putting all of this together, we get
InSecfsprg (FsGen; t′)
≥ SuccfsprgFsGen
(MA)
=
∣∣Pr [Expfsprg−1FsGen (MA) = 1]− Pr [Expfsprg−0FsGen (MA) = 1]∣∣
≥ 2−h · SuccFSSIG
XMSS?(1n
′
,2h)
(A)− 2−h · InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS′(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
and therefore
InSecFSSIG
(
XMSS?(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
≤ SuccFSSIG
XMSS?(1n′ ,2h) (A)
≤ 2h · InSecfsprg (FsGen; t′) + InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS′(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
.
This is the claimed result. Nevertheless, we still have to show that if MA is in
Expfsprg−0FsGen (MA), A, the success probability of A conditioned on the event thatMA
correctly guesses the time period A wants to break in, is limited by
A ≤ InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS′(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
.
We do this, showing how to build an oracle machine MˆA that behaves exactly like
MA, from A’s point of view. In contrast to MA, MˆA uses A either to forge a
signature for W-OTS with pseudorandom key generation (W-OTS?) or to find a
second-preimage for a random function h from Hn. Next, we describe MˆA.
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MˆA receives as input a second-preimage challenge, consisting of a preimage Xc
and a function key K identifying a function H from Hn as well as a W-OTS? public
key pkc. Furthermore, MˆA gets access to the corresponding signing oracle for pkc.
Like MA, MˆA chooses α $←− {1, . . . , 2h} uniformly at random. Additionally, MˆA
chooses β
$←− {0, α − 1} uniformly at random. Next, MˆA generates 2h W-OTS?
key pairs. This is done in a way simulating the Expfsprg−0FsGen (MA) case: For the first α
key pairs MˆA uses a random seed. Then, MˆA uses FsGen to compute Stateα using
a random seed and uses FsGen starting from Stateα to generate the seeds for the
remaining key pairs. Afterwards, MˆA replaces the key pair on position β by pkc.
As β ≤ α and pkc corresponds to a W-OTS? key pair where the seed is chosen at
random, the first α W-OTS? key pairs are now generated using random seeds and
the remaining W-OTS? key pairs are generated using FsGen, exactly as in the case
of MA.
Next, MˆA computes the XMSS-Tree starting from the bit strings of the W-OTS?
public keys, using H. During the XMSS-Tree computation, MˆA chooses a random
node from the set of all ancestor nodes of the bit strings of the first α W-OTS?
public keys. Then, MˆA chooses the bit masks for the level of this node such that
for this node the input to H is Xc. Then, MˆA uses the resulting XMSS public key
and starts to interact with A exactly the same way as MA does. Especially MˆA
aborts if A does not break in in time period i = α−1. MˆA can answer all signature
queries using the generated secret keys or the signing oracle for pkc in time period
i = β.
If A returns a valid forgery (M ′, (j, σ′,Auth′)) for time period j < α − 1, MˆA
computes the W-OTS? public key pk′j using the signature σ
′. Now, there are two
mutual exclusive cases:
(Case 1) If pk′j = pkj, σ
′ is an existential forgery for W-OTS?. So, if j = β MˆA
returns (M,σ′), otherwise MˆA aborts.
(Case 2) If pk′j 6= pkj, by the pigeon hole principle, there must be one node on the
paths from pk′j and pkj to the root, where the paths collide the first time. As this
node is an output of H and the inputs are different, MˆA found a collision. If one
of the inputs is Xc, MˆA returns the second-preimage. Otherwise MˆA aborts. MˆA
runs in time t′ = t+ 2h · tSign + tVf + tKg.
Now we compute the success probability of MˆA. Per assumption A breaks in
in time period i = α − 1. From A’s point of view, MˆA behaves exactly as MA.
Hence, A returns a valid forgery with probability A. In case 1, MˆA succeeds
with probability Pr[j = β] = 1
α
. But the success probability of MˆA for this case
is also upper bounded by its success probability against the EU-CMA-security of
W-OTS?, which is bound by InSecEU-CMA (W-OTS(1n, 1); t′, 1). Now we analyze
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case 2. We write Ancestorsα for the set of all ancestor nodes of the bit strings of the
first α W-OTS? public keys. Then MˆA succeeds with probability 1|Ancestorsα| . But the
success probability of MˆA in case 2 is also upper bounded by the second-preimage
resistance of Hn, InSecspr (Hn; t′). One of these cases appears with probability at
least 1
2
. Summing up we get
A ≤ 2 ·max
{
(α + 1) · InSecEU-CMA (W-OTS(1n, T = 1); t′, q = 1) ,
|Ancestorsα| · InSecspr (Hn; t′)
}
.
The right part of the equation takes its maximum value for α = 2h. Comparing this
with the result from [DOTV08] given in the proof of Theorem 4.4 we see that the
right part of the equation for α = 2h is exactly InSecEU-CMA
(
XMSS′(1n
′
, 2h); t, 1
)
.
This concludes the claim.
Combining this with the above result for FsGen yields that the maximum success
probability over all adversaries running in time ≤ t, making at most 1 query to each
instance of Sign, in attacking the forward security of XMSS? , InSecfssig (XMSS?; t, 1),
is bounded by
InSecfssig (XMSS?; t, 1)
≤ 22h+1 · InSecprf (Fn; (t′ + 2), 2)
+ 2 ·max

(2h+log ` − 1) · InSecspr (Hn; t′) ,
2h
(
InSecprf (Fn; (t′ + `), `)
+ `wκ
w−1
( 1κ− 12n )
· InSecprf (Fn; (t′ + w + 1), 2)
)
 , (4.2)
with t′ = t+ 2h · tSign + tVf + tKg. This concludes the proof.
4.4 Theoretical Performance
In this section we discuss the theoretical performance of XMSS. We show that the
performance of XMSS is closely related to that of the used function families. Hence,
XMSS and its forward secure variant are efficient ifHn is an efficient second-preimage
resistant hash function family and Fn an efficient pseudorandom function family.
Efficient here refers to the runtimes and space requirements for sufficiently secure
parameters. As the forward secure variant of XMSS is slightly less performant and
requires more space, we do the analysis for the forward secure variant. For practical
parameters and runtimes see Chapters 6 and 7.
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The tree traversal algorithm used to compute the nodes of the authentication
path has a huge influence on the runtime of the signature algorithm as well as on
the storage requirements for the state. For the BDS algorithm it has been shown in
[BDS09] that for h, k ≥ 2, h−k is even, it requires (5h+ ⌊h
2
⌋− 5k − 2 + 2k) ·n bits
for its state, including the secret key. Further it requires no more than (h−k)/2 + 1
leaf computations in the XMSS tree, 3(h−k−1)/2 + 1 evaluations of Hn, and h−k
calls to FsGen per signature. A leaf computation consists of evaluating FsGen
once, evaluating GEN` once, computing the W-OTS public key, and computing the
L-tree. The h − k extra calls to FsGen are used to compute upcoming states of
FsGen. There is no need to compute the output bits, because only the next state
is required. Therefore this requires only h− k evaluations of functions from Fn.
The runtime of all three algorithms of XMSS is dominated by the time required to
evaluate elements of Fn and Hn. We ignore the computational overhead for adding
the bitmasks, control flow, and computing the base w representation of the message
as it is negligible for every practical choice of Fn and Hn. We write tH (tF) for the
runtime of functions from Hn (Fn, respectively). Using a simple counting argument
we obtain the following result:
For one call to the XMSS signature algorithm, the runtime is bounded by
tSign ≤ tH
(
`+ 3
2
· (h− k) + `− 1
2
)
+ tF
(
`w + 4
2
· (h− k) + `w + 2
)
.
For one call to the XMSS signature verification algorithm, the runtime is bounded
by
tVf ≤ tH(h+ `) + tF(`w).
For one call to the XMSS key generation algorithm, the runtime is bounded by
tKg ≤ tH
(
2h(`+ 1)
)
+ tF
(
2h(2 + `(w + 1))
)
.
The space requirements for the internal state of Sign and Kg (including the secret
key) are determined by the space requirements of the tree traversal algorithm plus
the space requirements for the current state of FsGen and the index. Vf needs no
internal state. Hence, the space used by XMSS, using the BDS algorithm, is at most
|SK| ≤
(
5h+
⌊
h
2
⌋
− 5k − 2 + 2k + 1
)
· n+ |i| bits,
where |i| denotes the maximal binary length of the index. 2(h − k)n + n of these
bits have to be kept secret. For the remaining bits there is no secrecy requirement.
The public key has a size of
|PK| = 2n(h+ dlog `e+ 1) bits.

5 XMSSMT– XMSS with Virtually Un-
limited Signature Capacity
In this section we show how to extend XMSS in a way that one key pair can be used
to sign a virtually unlimited number of messages. We call the scheme Multi Tree
XMSS (XMSSMT ). Another important benefit of XMSSMT is that key generation
time is reduced from O(2h) to O(2h/d) for some integer parameter d that can be
chosen almost freely within [1, h− 1]. The construction is based on the idea of tree
chaining introduced in [BGD+06]. We also apply and improve the distributed signa-
ture generation technique proposed in [BDK+07] to further decrease the worst case
signing time. Again, we use W-OTS$ in our description. A variant using W-OTS+
is obtained, applying the same changes as for XMSS. We start with a descrip-
tion of the construction in Section 5.1. Then we discuss its security in Section 5.2
and finally analyze its correctness and theoretical performance in Section 5.3. The
contributions of this chapter were published as parts of [4, 12].
5.1 Multi Tree XMSS - XMSSMT
In this section we introduce XMSSMT . For a better understanding, we first give a
brief description of the scheme. For XMSSMT we extend the general concept of a
hash based signature scheme as used for XMSS using many layers of trees (here and
in the following we use tree synonym for a XMSS key pair, as it better depicts the
concept). Roughly speaking, we build a certification tree of XMSS key pairs. The
trees on the lowest layer are used to sign the messages whereas the trees on higher
layers are used to sign the roots of the trees on the layer below. The public key
contains only the root of the tree on the top layer. A signature consists of all the
signatures on the way to the highest tree. A graphical representation of the scheme
is shown in Figure 5.1. In the following we describe the construction in detail,
starting with the used parameters. Afterwards we describe the algorithms of the
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Figure 5.1: A schematic representation of a XMSSMT instance with four layers
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scheme. The building blocks are the same as for XMSS described in the previous
chapter.
Parameters. For security parameter n ∈ N, XMSSMT uses a pseudorandom func-
tion family Fn = {FK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n} and a second-preimage
resistant hash function H, chosen uniformly at random from the family Hn = {HK :
{0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n|K ∈ {0, 1}n}, like XMSS. Further parameters are the number
of layers d ∈ N, the binary message length m and one parameter set per layer.
For a layer 0 ≤ δ ≤ d − 1 a parameter set contains the tree height hδ ∈ N, the
BDS parameter kδ ∈ N with the restrictions kδ < hδ and hδ − kδ is even and the
Winternitz parameter wδ ∈ N, wδ ≥ 2. To enable improved distributed signature
generation we require (hδ+1 − kδ+1)/2 + 3 ≤ 2hδ−kδ+1 − 2 for 0 ≤ δ < d− 1, as well
as (h0 − k0)/2 ≥ d− 1. Let h =
∑d−1
δ=0 hδ, a XMSS
MT key pair can be used to sign
2h messages of m bits. These parameters are publicly known.
Key Generation. The XMSSMT key generation algorithm takes as input all of the
above parameters. First, the max0≤δ≤d−1{hδ + dlog `δe} bitmasks and the value X
used by W-OTS$ are chosen uniformly at random where `δ denotes the parameter `
for W-OTS on layer δ. The same bitmasks and X are used for all layers. Then, the
root of the first XMSS tree on each layer is computed. This is done in an ordered
way, starting from layer 0. For the tree Treeδ on layer δ the initial state of FsGen,
S0,δ is chosen uniformly at random and a copy of it is stored as part of the secret key
SK. The tree is constructed the same way as in the XMSS key generation algorithm
to compute Rootδ. When Rootδ, 0 ≤ δ < d−1, is computed, it is signed using the
first W-OTS key pair of Treeδ+1, which is computed next. This signature σδ+1 can
be extracted while Treeδ+1 is generated and hence does not need any additional
computation. Then σδ+1 is stored as part of SK. If the highest layer d−1 is reached,
Rootd−1 is stored in the public key PK. During the computation of Rootδ, the
state of the BDS algorithm StateBDS,δ is initialized as for XMSS.
Finally, the data structures for the next trees are initialized: For the next tree
Nextδ on each layer 0 ≤ δ < d−1 a FsGen state Sn,δ is chosen uniformly at random
and a new TreeHash stack Stacknext,δ is initialized. Also storage for a BDS state
StateBDS,n,δ is reserved. Summing up, SK consists of the states (S0,δ, StateBDS,δ), 0 ≤
δ ≤ d − 1 and the d − 1 signatures σδ, 0 < δ ≤ d − 1. Additionally, it contains
d− 1 FsGen states Sn,δ, d− 1 TreeHash stacks Stacknext,δ and d− 1 BDS states
StateBDS,n,δ for the next trees Nextδ on layer 0 ≤ δ < d − 1. The public key PK
consists of the max0≤δ≤d−1{hδ + dlog `δe} bitmasks, the value X and Rootd−1.
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Signature generation. The signature generation algorithm takes as input an m
bit message M , the secret key SK, and the index i, indicating that this is the ith
message signed with this keypair. The signature generation algorithm consists of two
phases. First, M is signed. A XMSSMT signature Σ = (i, σ0,Auth0, σ1,Auth1, . . . ,
σd−1,Authd−1) contains the index i, the W-OTS signature σ0 on the message M ,
the corresponding authentication path for Tree0 and the W-OTS signatures on
the roots of the currently used trees together with the corresponding authentication
paths. The only thing that has to be computed is σ0 — the W-OTS signature on
message M using the ith W-OTS key pair on the lowest layer. All authentication
paths and the W-OTS signatures on higher layers are already part of the current
secret key.
The second phase is used to update the secret key. Therefore BDS is initialized
with StateBDS,0 and receives (h0 − k0)/2 updates. If not all of these updates are
needed to update StateBDS,0, i.e. all scheduled node computations are finished and
there are still updates left, the remaining updates are used for the upper trees. On
the upper layers, not only the BDS state has to be updated. While one leaf is
used, one leaf in the next tree must be computed, i.e. the root computation has to
receive one update. Moreover, hδ − kδ FsGen states must be updated. This means
that remaining updates from layer zero are first used to update StateBDS,1. If all
scheduled node computations in StateBDS,1 are finished, one update is used for the
root computation of Next1. The next update is used for the FsGen states. If layer
1 does not need any more updates, the remaining updates are forwarded to layer 2
and so on, until either all updates are used or all tasks are done. Finally, one leaf
of the next tree is computed, i.e. the root computation for the next tree on layer 0
receives one update.
A special case occurs if i mod 2h0 = 2h0 − 1. In this case, the last W-OTS
key pair of the current Tree0 was used. This means that for the next signature
a new tree is needed on every layer δ with i mod 2hδ = 2hδ − 1. For all these
layers, Stacknext,δ already contains the root of Nextδ. So, Treeδ+1 is used to sign
Rootδ. Each signature is counted as one update. In case not all updates are needed,
remaining updates are forwarded to the first layer that did not get a new tree. In
SK, StateBDS,δ, Sδ, and Σδ are replaced by the newly computed data. Afterwards,
new data structures for the next tree on layer δ are initialized and used to replace
the ones in SK. Finally, the signature SIG, the updated secret key SK and i+ 1 are
returned.
Signature verification. The signature verification algorithm takes as input a sig-
nature Σ = (i, σ0,Auth0, σ1,Auth1, . . . , σd−1,Authd−1), the message M and the public
5.2 Security 67
key PK. To verify the signature, roughly speaking the XMSS verification algorithm
is first used for the signature of the lowest layer. The root value obtained in the last
step of the XMSS signature verification is then used as message for the next layer
and so on, until a root node for layer d− 1 is obtained. This value is then compared
to the value in the public key.
More specifically, σ0 and M are used to compute the corresponding W-OTS public
key. The corresponding leaf N0,j of Tree0 is constructed and used together with
Auth0 to compute the path (P0, . . . , Ph0) to the root of Tree0, where P0 = N0,j,
j = i mod 2h0 and
Pc =
{
H((Pc−1||Authc−1,0)⊕Bc), if bj/2cc ≡ 0 mod 2
H((Authc−1,0||Pc−1)⊕Bc), if bj/2cc ≡ 1 mod 2
for 0 ≤ c ≤ h0. This process is then iterated for 1 ≤ δ ≤ d− 1, using the output of
the last iteration Phδ−1 = Rootδ−1 as message and σδ, Authδ and j =
⌊
i/2
∑δ−1
b=0 hb
⌋
mod 2hδ . If the output of the last iteration Phd−1 equals the root value contained in
PK, Rootd−1, the signature is assumed to be valid and the algorithm returns 1. In
any other case it returns 0.
5.2 Security
In this section we show that XMSSMT is secure. More specifically, we prove the
following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. If Hn is a second-preimage resistant hash function family and Fn a
pseudorandom function family, then XMSSMT is a forward secure signature scheme.
The reasoning is as follows. From a theoretical point of view, XMSSMT can be
seen as a certification tree using XMSS. The proof is a straightforward combination
of the result from the last section about the forward security of XMSS and a result
from [MMM02]. For this reason we only sketch the proof for the special case of
XMSSMT .
Proof Sketch. Let’s look at XMSSMT the following way. Ignoring all algorithmic
improvements, XMSSMT uses d differently parameterized versions of XMSS. Denote
them as XMSS0, . . . ,XMSSd−1. Now one instance of XMSSd−1 is used to sign the
roots of 2hd−1 instances of XMSSd−2, one per leaf, and so on. The leaves of the
XMSS0 instances are used to sign the messages.
Now assume there exists an adversary A that breaks the forward security of
XMSSMT with probability SuccfssigXMSSMT (1n,2h) (A) running in time t. Then we can
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construct an oracle machineMA that breaks the forward security of one out of the
d XMSS versions used. As input MA receives one public key for every used XMSS
version XMSSδ and access to a corresponding signature oracle Signδ, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ d
that automatically performs a key update after every signature query. MA places
the challenge instance for a layer at a random position on this layer. If a challenge
instance is required to sign a message or a root, the corresponding signing oracle is
used. For the remaining XMSS instancesMA generates the key pairs and uses them
to sign. When A indicates to breakin, MA hands over all the secret key informa-
tion. If necessary,MA itself indicates a breakin for some of the challenge instances.
If A returns a valid forgery (M,Σ = (i, σ0,Auth0, σ1,Auth1, . . . , σd−1,Authd−1)),MA
starts a verification. Assume,MA stored the Root of all trees used before breakin
was indicated. According to the forward security notion, M is a new message. Now
during verificationMA compares the Root on every layer with the one it generated
itself or the Root in the public key of the challenge instance, respectively. If the
two Root nodes match on layer δ, MA found a forgery for the XMSS instance on
this layer. With probability 2−
∑
j=δ+1 d−1hj the current instance on layer δ is the
challenge instance and MA succeeds. Otherwise MA aborts.
Analyzing MA, we get that MA runs in time t′ ≤ t + tKg + 2htSign + tVf . With
probability SuccfssigXMSSMT (1n,2h) (A) A outputs a forgery. Then we got d mutually
exclusive cases caseδ, for 0 ≤ δ < d, i.e. the Root nodes match for the first time on
layer δ. As stated above, if the Root nodes match for the first time on layer δ, with
probability 2−
∑d−1
j=δ+1 hj the current instance on layer δ is the challenge instance. So
for each caseδ we get a bound
Succfssig
XMSS(1n,2hδ )
(MA) ≥ 2−∑d−1j=δ+1 hjSuccfssigXMSSMT (1n,2h) (A)
and hence
InSecfssig
(
XMSSMT (1n, 2h); t, 1
)
≤
d−1∑
0=δ
2
∑d−1
j=δ+1 hj · InSecfssig (XMSS(1n, 2hδ); t, 1) .
Replacing InSecfssig
(
XMSS(1n, 2hδ); t, 1
)
by the results from the last section leads
the claimed result.
5.3 Analysis
In the following we provide an analysis of XMSSMT . We first discuss its algorithmic
correctness, i.e. we show that all node computations, root computations, root signa-
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tures and FsGen updates finish in time. Afterwards, we discuss key and signature
sizes as well as theoretical runtimes of the algorithms.
5.3.1 Correctness
In the following we show that the (h0− k0)/2 updates per signature suffice to finish
all computations in time. A tree on layer δ needs (hδ − kδ)/2 updates to continue
the node computations for upcoming authentication paths and one update for the
computation of the root of the next tree Nextδ, to sign the root of Nextδ−1 and to
update the FsGen states, respectively. This makes 3 + (hδ − kδ)/2 updates. Please
recall that we require (hδ+1 − kδ+1)/2 + 3 ≤ 2hδ−kδ+1 − 2 for 0 ≤ δ < d − 1 as well
as (h0 − k0)/2 ≥ d− 1. The proof works by induction over layer δ.
Base case (δ = 0): Per construction a tree on layer 0 receives (h0 − k0)/2
updates for the node computations per signature. The remaining tasks (computation
of Next0, FsGen updates and generating one signature) are executed without
explicitly using updates and instead of a root node a message is signed. This is the
same as if it would receive the three additional updates and use them to fulfill these
tasks.
Inductive step (δ− 1⇒ δ): While one OTS signature on layer δ is used as part
of the XMSSMT signature, the OTS key pairs of a whole tree Treeδ−1 on layer δ−1
are used. Now, per assumption Treeδ−1 receives 3 + (hδ−1 − kδ−1)/2 updates per
signature. Three of these updates are directly used to update the computation of
the root of Nextδ−1, to update the FsGen states and to sign the next root node
on layer δ − 2 (or the message, if δ = 1). So there remain (hδ−1 − kδ−1)/2 updates
for BDS per signature. This makes a total of 2hδ−1(hδ−1 − kδ−1)/2 updates for the
whole tree.
For all authentication paths of Treeδ−1, the BDS algorithm has to compute
all right nodes of Treeδ−1 that are on a height < hδ−1 − kδ−1 once. The only
exceptions are the two first right nodes on every level as these nodes are stored
during initialization. The number of required updates for 2 ≤ kδ−1 ≤ hδ−1 is
hδ−1−kδ−1−1∑
j=0
(2hδ−1−j−1 − 2)2j = (hδ−1 − kδ−1)2hδ−1−1 − 2hδ−1−kδ−1+1 + 2.
Hence, there are
(hδ−1 − kδ−1)2hδ−1−1 − (hδ−1 − kδ−1)2hδ−1−1 + 2hδ−1−kδ−1+1 − 2 = 2hδ−1−kδ−1+1 − 2
unused updates, which are forwarded to Treeδ. As we require (hδ − δ)/2 + 3 ≤
2hδ−1−kδ−1+1 − 2, Treeδ receives the necessary number of updates per signature.
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There would still occur a problem, if the number of updates per signature were
smaller than d − 1. The reason is that this would mean that the roots of the new
trees on different layers could not always be signed using the updates of the last
signature before the change. In this case the private storage would grow, as we
would need some intermediate storage for the new signatures. This is the reason
why the second condition ((h0 − k0)/2 ≥ d− 1) is needed.
Please note that the condition (hδ − δ)/2 + 3 ≤ 2hδ−1−kδ−1+1 − 2 implies that we
do not allow kδ−1 = hδ−1. The reason is that even if all nodes in the current tree
are stored, we need at least two updates per signature to update the computation of
the root of Nextδ and to sign the next root node on layer δ− 1. As we do not need
to run BDS, there is no need to update the FsGen states. If now kδ−1 = hδ−1, we
cannot guarantee that layer δ − 1 leaves enough unused updates to execute these
necessary tasks. For parameters with kδ−1 = hδ−1 a more detailed analysis over all
layers of a key pair would be required.
5.3.2 Theoretical Performance
First we look at the sizes. A signature contains the index and d pairs of W-OTS
signature and authentication path. Hence a signature takes 24+n·∑d−1δ=0(`δ+hδ) bits,
assuming we reserve three bytes for the index. The public key contains the bitmasks,
X and Rootd−1. Thus, the public key size is n ·(max0≤δ≤d−1{hδ+dlog `δe}+2) bits.
The secret key contains a single FsGen state as well as one BDS state which in turn
consists of 2(hδ − kδ) FsGen states and no more than (3hδ + bhδ2 c − 3kδ − 2 + 2kδ)
tree nodes per currently used tree Treeδ [BDS08]. In addition, it contains the
d − 1 W-OTS signatures σ1, . . . , σd−1 which have a total size of n ·
∑d−1
δ=1 `δ bits
and the data structures for upcoming trees. These data structures do not require
a full BDS state, as only those arrays in StateBDS,n,δ are needed that are filled
during initialization. Moreover, the space to store the k top levels of nodes can be
shared with the corresponding space in StateBDS,δ. Thus, these structures require
only (hδ − kδ + 1) FsGen states (one for building the tree and the remaining as
storage for the BDS state) and no more than 3hδ − kδ + 1 tree nodes per Nextδ,
0 ≤ δ < d− 1. The total secret key size is
n ·
(
d−1∑
δ=0
[(
5hδ +
⌊
hδ
2
⌋
− 5kδ − 2 + 2kδ
)
+ 1
]
+
d−2∑
δ=0
(`δ+1 + 4hδ − 2kδ + 2)
)
bits.
For the runtimes we only look at the worst case times and get the following. During
key generation, the first tree on each layer has to be computed. This means, that
each of the 2hδ W-OTS key pairs has to be generated, including the execution of the
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PRGs. Furthermore, to obtain the root, the leaves of the trees have to be computed
as well as all internal nodes of the tree. If key generation generates the trees in order,
starting from the first one, the W-OTS signatures on the roots of lower trees need no
additional computation as the signature can be extracted while the corresponding
W-OTS key pair is generated. The key generation time is
tKg ≤ tH
(
d−1∑
δ=0
(
2hδ(`δ + 1)
))
+ tF
(
d−1∑
δ=1
(
2hδ(2 + `δ(wδ + 1))
))
,
where tH and tF denote the runtimes of one evaluation of H and F, respectively.
During one call to Sign, a W-OTS signature on the message must be generated,
including generation of the key (tF(2 + `0(w0 + 1))), the BDS algorithm receives
(h0 − k0)/2 updates, one leaf of the next tree on layer 0 must be computed and
the BDS algorithm updates h0 − k0 upcoming seeds (tF(h0 − k0)). The worst case
signing time is bounded by
tSign ≤ max
δ∈[0,d−1]
{
tH
(
h0−k0+2
2
· (hδ − kδ + `δ) + h0
)
+tF
(
h0−k0+4
2
· (`δ(wi + 1)) + h0 − k0
) } .
Signature verification consists of computing d W-OTS public keys and the corre-
sponding leafs plus hashing to the root. Summing up verification takes
tVf ≤
d−1∑
δ=0
(tH (`δ + hδ) + tF (`δwδ))
in the worst case.

6 Choosing Optimal Parameters for
XMSS∗
In this chapter we show how to choose parameters for XMSS∗, i.e. XMSS and
XMSSMT . More specifically we show how to select parameters that yield a provably
secure instantiation on the one hand and result in provably optimal performance
for a given use case on the other hand. Towards this end, we first show how to
compute the security level of XMSS∗ for a given parameter set. Afterwards we show
how to model parameter selection as a linear optimization problem. Here, we only
discuss the more complicated case of XMSSMT . The model for XMSS is obtained
using the same techniques but the equations from Section 4.4. Finally, we provide
optimal parameters for two exemplary use cases. The contributions of this chapter
were published as parts of [2, 4, 12].
6.1 Security Level of XMSS∗
In the following we show how to compute the security level of XMSS and XMSSMT
for given parameters. Security level here is used in the sense of [Len04]1. This allows
a comparison of the security of XMSS∗ with the security of a symmetric primitive
like a block cipher for given security parameters. For example a security level of 128
bit is comparable to the security of AES with 128 bit keys. More specifically, we say
that XMSS∗ has security level b if a successful attack on the scheme can be expected
to require approximately 2b−1 evaluations of a hash function or block cipher on the
average, following [Len04]. We detail the computation of the security level for the
forward secure XMSS construction.
1The website http://www.keylength.org allows one to compute the security level for today’s
signature schemes. It also shows an estimation of how long a given security level is assumed to
be secure according to [Len04].
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6.1.1 Security Level of XMSS using W-OTS$
We now compute the security level of XMSS. Therefore we use the exact insecurity
function given in equation 4.2. We can compute the security level, finding a lower
bound for t such that 1/2 ≤ InSecFSSIG (XMSS; t, 1). According to the proof of The-
orem 4.4, XMSS can only be attacked by attacking the second preimage resistance
of Hn or the pseudorandomness of Fn. Following the reasoning in [Len04], we only
take into account generic attacks on Hn and Fn.
For the insecurity ofH(n) under generic attacks we assume InSecspr (H(n); t) = t
2n
which corresponds to a brute force search for second preimages. For the insecurity
of Fn under generic attacks we assume that the best attack is a brute force key
retrieval attack. Lemma 3.13 shows that if we assume Fn to be a PRF with security
level n we get InSecprf (Fn; t, q) = t2n−logκ ·
(
1
κ
− 1
2n
)
for the insecurity function and
from Lemma 3.12 it follows that the number of key collisions κ ≤ 2. Now, let
t′ = t+ t′′+ max{`, w+ 1, 2} where t′′ = 2h · tSign + tVf + tKg. We compute the lower
bound on t. The following bound holds for t′′ < min{2n−2h−5, 2n−h−w−log `w−4}) −
max{`, w+ 1, 2}. We comment on the reasonableness of this bound after presenting
the bit security.
1
2
≤ InSecFSSIG (XMSS; t, q = 1)
≤ 22h+1 t
′
2n−log κ
(
1
κ
− 1
2n
)
+ 2 ·max
 (2
h+log ` − 1) · t′
2n
,
2h
(
t′
2n−log κ
(
1
κ
− 1
2n
)
+ (`wκw−1 1
( 1κ− 12n )
) · t′
2n−log κ
(
1
κ
− 1
2n
))

< 22h+1
t′
2n−1
(
1
2
)
+ 2h+1
(
t′
2n−1
(
1
2
)
+ (`w2w−1) · t
′
2n−1
)
=
t′
2n−2h−1
+
t′
2n−h−1
+
t′
2n−h−w−log `w−1
t′ >
2n−h−2
2h + 1 + 2w+log `w
t′ >
2n−h−2
2 max{2h+1, 2w+log `w}
t′ > min{2n−2h−4, 2n−h−w−log `w−3}
Now, using t′ = t+ t′′ + max{`, w + 1, 2} and the above condition on t′′ we obtain
t > min{2n−2h−5, 2n−h−w−log `w−4}.
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Therefore, the security level for XMSS is
b > n− h− 3−max {h+ 1, w + log `w} .
The used bound on t′′ is reasonable whenever a parameter set leads to a reasonable
security level. This is the case as t′′ is the time required to generate a key pair,
use it to sign the maximum number of possible messages, and verify each of these
signatures. Almost half of this time is required for key generation, a task that must
be computable in reasonable time. Now, the bound says that this time must be
smaller than the average runtime of a successful attack on the scheme, a task that
should be impossible to do in reasonable time, minus max{`, w + 1, 2}. The result
of the maximum must be much smaller than the gap between the runtimes as any
possible outcome appears as a multiplicative factor in the theoretical formulas of all
XMSS runtimes.
6.1.2 Security Level of XMSS using W-OTS+
Now, we compute the security level of XMSS using W-OTS+. The computa-
tion is almost the same as above. We have to replace the insecurity function
for W-OTS by that for W-OTS+ in the proofs to obtain the insecurity function
for XMSS using W-OTS+. Denote the function family used by W-OTS+ by Gn.
Besides the generic attacks described above, we also need generic attacks against
one-wayness and undetectability. We assume InSecow (Gn; t) = t2n which corre-
sponds to a brute force search for preimages. For the insecurity regarding unde-
tectability we assume InSecud (Gn; t) = t2n following [DSS05]. We again use an
upper bound on t′′. This time we have t′ = t + t′′ + max{`, 2w, 2} and we require
t′′ < min{2n−2h−5, 2n−h−log `(w2+w)−4})−max{`, 2w, 2}, which holds for all reasonable
parameters using the same argumentation as above. The resulting security level for
XMSS is
b > n− h− 1−max{h+ 3, log(`2w2 + w)} .
6.1.3 Security Level of XMSSMT
Using the same reasoning as above, we can compute the security level of XMSSMT .
We present two lower bounds on the security level for XMSSMT , one for the case of
W-OTS$ and one for W-OTS+. For similar bounds on the runtime of the algorithms
as above, we can lower bound the security level b of XMSSMT , using W-OTS$ by
b > min
0≤δ≤d−1
{
n− hδ − log d− (
d−1∑
j=δ+1
hj)− 3−max {hδ − 1, wδ − log(`δwδ)}
}
.
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Similarly, for the case of W-OTS+ we obtain
b > min
0≤δ≤d−1
{
n− hδ − log d− (
d−1∑
j=δ+1
hj)− 1−max
{
hδ + 3, log(`δ2w
2
δ + w)
}}
.
6.2 Optimization
Given the theoretical formulas for runtimes and sizes from Section 5.3.2, we now
show how to use them to model the parameter selection problem as linear opti-
mization problem. There are parameters which control different trade-offs. The
BDS parameters kδ ∈ N control a trade-off between signature time and secret key
size. The Winternitz parameters wδ ∈ N control a trade-off between runtimes and
signature size. Finally, the number of layers d determines a trade-off between key
generation and signature time on the one hand and signature size on the other hand.
Moreover, there are the different tree heights δ that do not define any obvious trade-
off, but influence the security as well as the performance of the scheme. The goal
of the optimization is to choose these parameters. The function families Fn and Hn
can be instantiated, either using a cryptographic hash function or a block cipher.
Hence, the security parameter n is restricted to the output size of such functions.
We choose 128 and 256 bit corresponding to AES and SHA-2 for our optimization,
respectively.
Optimization Model. To find good parameter choices, we use linear optimization.
In the following we discuss how we model the problem of optimal parameter choices
as a linear optimization problem. As objective function of our problem we chose
a weighted sum of all runtimes and sizes that should be minimized. Using the
weights, it is possible to control the importance of minimizing a certain parameter
and thereby using the model for different scenarios. We further allow to apply
absolute bounds on the runtimes and sizes. The formulas for runtimes and sizes
are modeled as constraints as well as the parameter restrictions and the formula for
bit security from above. The input to the model are the runtimes of F and H for
n = 128 and n = 256, the overall height h, the message length m and a value b as
lower bound on the bit security.
As many of our initial constraints are not linear, we have to linearize all functions
and restrictions. This is done using the generalized lambda method [Mor07]. In
addition, we split the problem into sub problems each having some decision variables
fixed. The optimization problem contains the parameters of the scheme (d, n, the
hδ, kδ, wδ for all layers) as decision variables which are determined by solving the
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optimization problem. Furthermore, the message length mδ on each layer has to be
modelled as a decision variable. Since solving the optimization problem takes much
time and memory, we split the problem into sub problems by fixing the decision
variables n and d. Therefore, we receive one sub problem for each combination of
possible values of n and d. The resulting sub problems are solved independently and
the best of their solutions is chosen as global solution of the original optimization
problem.
The next step is to linearize the remaining sub problems by using the generalized
lambda method. Therefore, we introduce a grid point for each possible combination
of the remaining variables h, k, w and m on each layer δ. For each grid point we
have a binary variable λh,k,w,m,δ which takes value 1 if the combination of h, k, w,m is
chosen on layer δ. Otherwise, it takes value 0. Since we need one choice of h, k, w,m
for each δ ∈ [0, d− 1], d λ’s must be chosen.
We use those lambdas to calculate the functions describing the problem. Thus,
before optimizing we determine the values of the functions for each possible values of
their variables. To make this feasible, we have to introduce bounds on the decision
variables. We bound the tree height per layer by 24. As k ≤ h this bound also
applies to k. For w we chose 255. These bounds are reasonable for the scenarios of
the next section. For different scenarios they might have to be changed. Then, to
model the needed space of signatures
∑d−1
δ=0 (`δ + hδ) · n, we formulate the constraint
SpaceSig ==
d−1∑
δ=0
24∑
h=1
24∑
k=1
512∑
w=2
∑
m∈{128,256}
λh,k,w,m,i · fSpaceSig(w, h,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre−calculated
in the optimization model, where fSpaceSig(w, h,m) = (`+h)n. Thus, SpaceSig gives
the exact value of the needed space of signatures for the choice of lambda’s and can
be used in constraints and objective function.
To linearize a condition containing the maximum of some terms, such as the public
key size n · (max0≤δ≤d−1{hδ + dlog `δe}+ 2), we write the following constraint:
∀δ ∈ {1, ..., d}
SpacePK ≥
24∑
h=1
24∑
k=1
512∑
w=2
∑
m∈{128,256}
λh,k,w,m,δ · (fdlog `e(w,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre−calculated
+h+ 2)n.
Hence, SpacePK gives the public key size for the choice of lambda’s. This constraint
pushes the value of SpacePK up high and due to the objective function the value
will be pushed down as low as possible, so that in the end it takes the exact value.
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6.3 Results
In this section we present optimal parameters for two exemplary use cases. To solve
the optimization problem, we used the IBM Cplex solver [IBM] that implements the
Simplex algorithm [Dan63] with some improvements. The linearization described in
the last section is exact. Thus, there is no loss of information or error. Therefore, it
can be proven that the solution found by linear optimization based on the Simplex
algorithm is the best possible solution. In the following we present the results and
compare them with the results for parameter sets proposed in [BDH11] and [HBB13].
We choose a message length of 256 bits for all use cases assuming that the message
is the output of a collision resistant hash function. Moreover, we use 80 bits as
lower bound for the provable bit security. This seems reasonable, as the used bit
security represents a provable lower bound on the security of the scheme and is not
related to any known attacks. We used the instantiations for F and H proposed in
[BDH11] with AES and SHA2 for n = 128 and n = 256, respectively and measured
the resulting runtimes on a Laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @2.5
GHz and 8 GB RAM. We got tF = 0.000225ms and tH = 0.00045ms for n = 128
as well as tF = 0.00169ms and tH = 0.000845ms for n = 256. As W-OTS, we used
W-OTS$. Furthermore we used less tight bounds on the bit security from [HBB13]
and [BDH11] to achieve comparability.
The first use case we look at meets the requirements of a document or code
signature. We assume that the most important parameters are signature size and
verification time. We try to minimize them, while keeping reasonable bounds on the
remaining parameters. We used the bounds tSign < 1000ms, tVf < 1000ms, tKg < 60s,
sk < 25kB, pk < 1.25kB, σ < 100kB and the weights tSign = 0.00000001, tVf =
0.00090000, tKg = 0.00000001, sk = 0.00000001, σ = 0.99909996, pk = 0.00000001
for h = 20. We chose different weights for tVf and σ, because the optimization
internally counts in bits and milliseconds. We set the weights such that 1ms costs
the same as 1000 bit. The remaining weights are not set to zero but to 1.0e − 8,
the smallest possible value that we allow. This is necessary to ensure that our
implementation of inequalities in the model works. This also ensures that within
the optimal solutions regarding tVf and σ, the best one regarding the remaining
parameters is chosen. It turns out that the optimization can be solved for d ≥ 2.
For d = 1 the bound on the key generation time cannot be achieved for the required
height. If we relax this bound to be tKg < 600s, i.e. 10 minutes, the problem can be
solved for n = 128 using AES. For d ≥ 2 this relaxation does not change the results.
The optimal parameters for this setting are n = 128, d = 2, h0 = 17, k0 = 5, w0 = 5
and h1 = 3, k1 = 3, w1 = 22. For comparison we used a parameter set from [HBB13]
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Runtimes (ms) Sizes (bit)
Use case tKg tSign tVf σ PK SK
UC1 optimal 27251 1.65 0.36 21376 6144 25472
UC1 from [HBB13] 326 1.00 0.28 28288 4608 25856
UC2 optimal 166min 25.55 9.13 83968 13824 209152
UC2 from [BDK+07] 98min 14.53 5.01 119040 13824 233472
Table 6.1: Runtimes and sizes for optimized parameters and parameters proposed in
previous works.
that matches the bound on the bit security (n = 128, d = 2, h0 = h1 = 10, k0 =
k1 = 4, w0 = w1 = 4). The resulting runtimes and sizes are shown in Table 6.1.
The results show that it is possible to reduce the signature size by almost one kilo
byte, changing the other parameters within their bounds and increasing the second
important parameter, the verification time, by 0.08 milliseconds.
As a second use case we take a total tree height of 80 and aim for a balanced
performance over all parameters. This use case corresponds to the use in a com-
munication protocol. Again, we choose the weights such that 1ms costs the same
as 1000 bit but this time we use the same weights for all runtimes and for all sizes.
For comparison we use parameters from [BDK+07] (d = 4, h0 = h1 = h2 = h3 = 20,
w0 = 5, w1 = w2 = w3 = 8, k0 = k1 = k2 = k3 = 4). As they do not use a
BDS parameter, we choose k = 4 on all layers. To make a fair comparison, we
limited our optimization also to four layers. The optimal parameters returned by
the optimization are h0 = h1 = h2 = h3 = 20, w0 = 14, w1 = w2 = w3 = 24 and
k0 = k1 = k2 = 4, k3 = 2. The results are shown in Table 6.1. It turns out that
again, by trading some runtime, the signature size can be significantly reduced.

7 XMSS∗ in Practice
To finally backup our claim regarding practicality of XMSS and XMSSMT , we im-
plemented the schemes to provide practical evidence. In this chapter we present
runtimes of a C implementation of XMSS on a standard CPU as well as runtimes
of XMSSMT and XMSS on an of-the-shelf smart card and compare the results with
those of other signature schemes. We also use the runtimes to show the influence
of the different parameters on the practical performance of the schemes. We first
generally discuss different possible implementations of the used function families in
practice. Afterwards we first present the C implementation and end with the smart
card implementation. The contributions of this chapter were published as parts of
[2, 4, 7].
7.1 Implementing the Function Families
The implementation of XMSS+ is straightforward besides the implementation of the
used function families Fn and Hn as well as Gn when W-OTS+ is used. We propose
constructions based on hash functions and block ciphers for all three function families
and argue why they are secure.
Instantiations using Hash Functions. First we discuss the hash function based
constructions. We assume a hash function Hash that takes inputs of arbitrary
length2 and outputs n bit hash values. If we assume Hash is a secure cryptographic
hash function, we can use Hash as the randomly chosen function from Hn and
Gn. To assume that Hash is a randomly chosen element of a hash function family,
is common practice. This is the case because in theory we assume hash function
families but in practice cryptographic hash functions are constructed as a single
2In practice the input length is mostly bounded by 264 bits. This can be assumed to be virtually
unlimited.
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function [RS04]. Furthermore, cryptographically secure hash functions are assumed
to be second-preimage resistant, one-way and undetectable.
The more complicated part is to implement Fn. Some hash functions like SHA-3
come with a special PRF mode. If this is not the case, we propose a construction
for any secure hash function that uses the Merkle-Darmgard (M-D) construction
[Mer90b, Dam90]. The family Fn is constructed as follows. Given a hash function
Hash with block length b and output size n that uses the M-D construction, we
construct the function family Fn as
fK(M) = Hash(Pad(K)||Pad(M)),
for key K ∈ {0, 1}n, message M ∈ {0, 1}n and Pad(X) = (X||10b−|X|−1) for |X| < b.
We argue that it is reasonable to assume that this is a secure PRF if Hash is a
secure cryptographic hash function. The assumptions we use are essentially those
used for the security of HMAC using a practical hash function. In [BCK96a] it is
assumed that the compression function of a good M-D hash function is a pseudoran-
dom function family if it is keyed using the input. In [BCK96b], it is assumed, that
the compression function of a good M-D hash function is a pseudorandom function
family if keyed on the chaining input. Furthermore it is shown, that a fixed input
length M-D hash function, keyed using the initialization vector (IV), is a pseudo-
random function family for fixed length inputs. In our construction the internal
compression function of Hash is evaluated twice: First on the IV and the padded
key, second on the resulting chaining value and the padded message. Due to the
pseudorandomness of the compression function when keyed on the message input,
the first evaluation works as a pseudorandom key generation. As we have a fixed
message length, the second iteration is a pseudorandom function family keyed using
the IV input.
Instantiations using Block Ciphers. Now we present constructions using a block
cipher E(K,M) with block and key length n bit. This is of special interest in case
of AES, because many smart card crypto co-processors and also most of today’s
Intel processors provide hardware acceleration for AES. To implement Fn we use
E without modification as the theoretical standard model for a block cipher is a
pseudorandom permutation family. Therefore, we assume that for a secure block
cipher this is indeed the case. To implement H we build a compression function
using the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) construction [MMO85] and iterate it using
the M-D construction. This is shown in Figure 7.1. More specifically we compute
HK(M) = C2 for M = M1||M2, with
Ci = ECi−1(Mi)⊕Mi, C0 = K, 0 < i ≤ 2.
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Figure 7.1: Construction of H using AES with the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas construction in
M-D Mode.
  AES   AES
M1 M2
K HK(M)
In [BRS02] the authors give a black box proof for the security of the above com-
pression function construction. There is no need to use M-D strengthening, as our
domain has fixed size.
To construct Gn we also use the MMO construction. As Gn maps bit strings of
length n to bit strings of the same length, we do not need a domain extension method
like M-D. Hence, we only use one round of MMO and compute
GK(M) = EK(M)⊕M.
Remark 7.1. Please note that we left the area of provable security in this section.
All the proposed constructions are heuristic as the statements about the used hash
functions and block ciphers are. While we cannot prove that the implementations are
secure we argued why they are reasonable. One might look at this as our hardness
assumptions being something like the used hash function is second-preimage resis-
tant. For a hash function like SHA-2 this might be analyzed in the same detail as
the hardness of some algebraic or number theoretic problem for given parameters.
7.2 C Implementation
We now discuss our implementation of XMSS for general purpose CPUs. The imple-
mentation was done in C and it uses the OpenSSL library3 for the implementation of
hash functions and block ciphers. The implementation supports any hash function
or block cipher supported by OpenSSL and any combination of these. For our mea-
surements we used either AES or SHA2 to implement all function families. Table
7.1 shows our experimental results for XMSS with W-OTS$ on a computer with
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz, 8GB RAM, and Intel AES-NI4.
The displayed results are for the forward secure construction. The construction for
3http://www.openssl.org/
4http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-instructions-aes-ni
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Table 7.1: XMSS performance for m = 256 on a computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz and 8GB RAM. b denotes the bit security. For the chosen
parameters, the bit security is the same for forward security and EU-CMA security.
AES-NI and AES are used with 128 bit keys. We used standard SHA2 with 256 bit
digests.
Timings (ms) Sizes (byte)
Function h k w Keygen Sign Verify Secret key Public key Signature b
SHA2 10 4 4 868 3.47 0.43 1,604 1,188 4,580 229
SHA2 10 4 16 1,522 6.38 0.75 1,604 1,124 2,468 216
SHA2 10 4 64 3,925 16.67 1.97 1,604 1,060 1,764 167
SHA2 10 4 108 5,839 24.85 2.94 1,604 1,060 1,604 122
SHA2 16 4 4 54,180 5.96 0.44 2,660 1,572 4,772 220
SHA2 16 4 16 95,876 10.70 0.75 2,660 1,508 2,660 210
SHA2 16 4 64 247,494 27.83 1.95 2,660 1,444 1,956 161
SHA2 16 4 108 369,741 41.58 2.91 2,660 1,444 1,796 116
SHA2 20 8 4 879,010 6.09 0.45 10,404 1,828 4,900 212
SHA2 20 8 16 1,531,497 10.90 0.76 10,404 1,764 2,788 206
SHA2 20 8 64 3,991,598 28.54 1.98 10,404 1,700 2,084 157
SHA2 20 8 108 5,982,298 42.43 2.93 10,404 1,700 1,924 112
SHA2 20 4 4 868,647 7.62 0.44 3,364 1,828 4,900 212
SHA2 20 4 16 1,534,748 13.71 0.76 3,364 1,764 2,788 206
SHA2 20 4 64 4,012,157 35.60 1.97 3,364 1,700 2,084 157
SHA2 20 4 108 5,941,291 53.15 2.93 3,364 1,700 1,924 112
AES-NI 10 4 4 55 0.24 0.07 804 596 2,292 101
AES-NI 10 4 16 77 0.33 0.06 804 564 1,236 88
AES-NI 16 4 4 3,505 0.41 0.07 1,332 788 2,388 92
AES-NI 16 4 16 4,915 0.56 0.06 1,332 756 1,332 82
AES-NI 20 8 4 56,526 0.42 0.07 5,204 916 2,452 84
AES-NI 20 8 16 78,728 0.57 0.06 5,204 884 1,396 78
AES-NI 20 4 4 56,066 0.52 0.07 1,684 916 2,452 84
AES-NI 20 4 16 79,196 0.71 0.06 1,684 884 1,396 78
AES 10 4 4 129 0.49 0.11 804 596 2,292 101
AES 10 4 16 168 0.72 0.11 804 564 1,236 88
AES 16 4 4 7,500 0.84 0.11 1,332 788 2,388 92
AES 16 4 16 10,832 1.21 0.11 1,332 756 1,332 82
AES 20 8 4 120,433 0.85 0.11 5,204 916 2,452 84
AES 20 8 16 171,674 1.22 0.11 5,204 884 1,396 78
AES 20 4 4 119,736 1.06 0.11 1,684 916 2,452 84
AES 20 4 16 172,851 1.53 0.11 1,684 884 1,396 78
RSA 2048 - 3.08 0.09 ≤ 512 ≤ 512 ≤ 256 95
DSA 2048 - 0.89 1.06 ≤ 512 ≤ 512 ≤ 256 95
MSS-SPR (n=128, h=20) 232 960 8,512 98
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EU-CMA security has slightly faster runtimes and the secret keys are 2(h− k) · n
bits smaller. The key pairs can be used to sign about 1,000 (h = 10), 65,000 (h = 16)
or one million messages (h = 20). To show the effect of this limitation in practice,
we give an example. If a key pair is used for one year, it can be used to sign about
3, 179, or 2872 messages a day, for h = 10, h = 16, and h = 20, respectively.
The last column of the table shows the bit security of the configuration. Following
the heuristic of Lenstra and Verheul [LV01] with the updated equations [Len04] the
configurations with bit security 84 are secure until 2024. The configurations with a
bit security of 100 and more are at least secure until 2048. Please note that these
numbers are based on the provable security and not on the runtimes of possible
attacks, which is the common practice and for example used for the security level of
RSA and DSA. This would result in better values. For this reason we included also
settings where the bit security is smaller than 80 bits. For RSA and DSA [Len04]
provides an optimistic and a conservative estimate. The optimistic estimate says
RSA and DSA with 2048 bit keys have 95 bits of security and are assumed to be
secure until 2040. The conservative estimation says 90 bits of security and secure
until 2033. The timings for RSA and DSA were taken using the OpenSSL speed
command. As this does not provide timings for key generation, we had to leave this
field blank.
The results show that XMSS is comparable to existing signature schemes. Only
the key generation takes more time. This problem is solved by XMSSMT . But even
without tree chaining, key generation takes less then 100 minutes for h = 20 and
w = 108. As key generation is an oﬄine task that needs no user interaction, this
might not be a problem in many cases. Moreover, the results show the different
trade-offs. Using a larger w, the signature size shrinks while the runtimes increase.
Unfortunately, also the bit security decreases for bigger w. This can be avoided using
W-OTS+. Using a larger k, the runtimes of signature generation and verification
decrease while the secret key size increases. The choice of k has no influence on the
bit security.
The results also show the influence of n by comparing AES (n = 128) and SHA2
(n = 256). AES is obviously much faster than SHA2 and keys as well as signatures
using SHA2 are about twice the size of those for AES. The only drawback using AES
is the significant decrease in the bit security. This can be solved using W-OTS+
instead of W-OTS$. Last but not least, the use of AES is interesting, because many
new CPUs come with hardware acceleration for AES. Our results show that using
AES-NI results in a speed up of approximately 50 %.
The results for AES also show that most of the time is used for W-OTS. Looking
at the signature verification times, there is no recognizable change, even if the height
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is doubled. Hence, the runtimes remain the same in case of AES or get even faster
in case of SHA2 replacing W-OTS$ by W-OTS+ as the instantiations ofn need at
most the same number of evaluations of the underlying primitive. The additional
xor operations will not be recognizable measuring milliseconds. Something else that
might seem confusing is that in case of AES-NI verification for w = 16 is faster than
for w = 4. For w = 16, ` is reduced from 133 to 67 while w is quadrupeled. On
average, twice the number of evaluations of AES is needed to compute the W-OTS
verification key. On the other hand, the number of nodes in the L-tree is halved and
as hashing requires two evaluations of AES this reduces the final runtime.
The last row of table 7.1 shows the signature and key size for MSS-SPR [DOTV08].
To make the results from [DOTV08] comparable, we computed the signature and
public key size for message length m = 256 bit, using their formulas. [DOTV08] does
not provide runtimes, therefore we had to leave these fields blank. Comparing XMSS
using SHA-256 and w = 108 with MSS-SPR shows that even for a slightly higher
bit security we achieve a signature size of less than 25 % of the signature size of
MSS-SPR. Moreover, the secret key of MSS-SPR is bigger. Although the authors of
[DOTV08] mention the possibility to generate the secret key using a pseudorandom
generator, this is not covered by their security proof. For the provided values a
secret key of size 2h ·mn is assumed. Anyhow, a secret key size compareable to that
of XMSS is possible using the pseudorandom key generation described in this work.
7.3 Smart Card Implementation
In this section we present a smart card implementation of XMSS and XMSSMT with
W-OTS$. First we give a description of our implementation. Then we present our
results and compare the performance of XMSS, XMSSMT , RSA and ECDSA. At the
end of the section we discuss an issue regarding the non-volatile memory (NVM).
Implementation Details. For the implementation we use as smart card an Infineon
SLE78 CFLX4000PM offering 8 KB RAM and 404 KB NVM. Its core consists of
a 16-bit CPU running at 33 MHz. Besides other peripherals, it provides a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG), a symmetric and an asymmetric crypto co-
processor. We use the hardware accelerated AES implementation of the card to
implement the function families F and H using the block cipher based constructions
from above. All random inputs of the schemes are generated using the TRNG. We
implemented XMSS and XMSSMT with two layers (d = 2). We also restricted w to
powers of two, which speeds up and simplifies the implementation.
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Table 7.2: Results for XMSS and XMSSMT (d = 2) for message length m = 256 on an
Infineon SLE78. We use the same k and w for both trees. b denotes the security level in
bits. The value in parentheses denotes the security level using W-OTS+. The signature
times are worst case times.
Timings (ms) Sizes (byte)
Scheme h k w KeyGen Sign Verify Secret key Public key Signature b
XMSS+ 16 2 4 5,600 106 25 3,760 544 3,476 94 (97)
XMSS+ 16 2 8 5,800 105 21 3,376 512 2,436 90 (96)
XMSS+ 16 2 16 6,700 118 22 3,200 512 1,892 81 (94)
XMSS+ 16 2 32 10,500 173 28 3,056 480 1,588 65 (93)
XMSS+ 20 4 4 22,200 106 25 4,303 608 3,540 90 (93)
XMSS+ 20 4 8 22,800 105 21 3,920 576 2,500 86 (92)
XMSS+ 20 4 16 28,300 124 22 3,744 576 1,956 77 (90)
XMSS+ 20 4 32 41,500 176 28 3,600 544 1,652 61 (89)
XMSS 10 4 4 14,600 86 22 1,680 608 2,292 101
XMSS 10 4 16 18,800 100 17 1,648 576 1,236 88
XMSS 16 4 4 925,400 134 23 2,448 800 2,388 92
XMSS 16 4 16 1,199,100 159 18 2,416 768 1,332 82
Results. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the runtimes of our implementation with different
parameter sets. We use the same k and w for both trees. The last column shows
the security level for the given parameter sets. Following the updated heuristic
of Lenstra and Verheul [Len04] the configurations with a security level of 81 (85,
86) bits are secure until the year 2019 (2025, 2026). Again, please note that these
numbers represent a lower bound on the provable security level. A successful attack
would still require an adversary to either find a second-preimage in a 128 bit hash
function or to launch a successful key retrieval attack on AES 128. This would
result in 128 bit security for all parameter sets. In Table 7.2, the signature time is
the worst case time over all signatures of one key pair. The secret key size in the
table differs from the values we would obtain using the theoretical formulas from
chapter 5. This is because it includes all data that has to be stored on the card to
generate signatures, including the bitmasks and X.
We used parameter sets with two heights. A key pair with h = 16 allows to gener-
ate more than 65, 000, one with h = 20 to generate more than one million signatures.
Assuming a validity period of one year, this corresponds to seven signatures per day
and two signatures per minute, respectively. The runtimes show, that XMSSMT key
generation can be done on the smart card in practical time. For all but one used
parameter set, the key generation time is below 30 seconds. The times for signature
generation and verification are all below 200 ms and 30 ms, respectively. The size
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Table 7.3: Results for XMSS+ for message length m = 256 on an Infineon SLE78 for
different values of k. We use the same k and w for both trees. The table shows the worst
case signing times, as well as the average case times
Timings (ms) Size (byte)
Scheme h k w KeyGen Sign (w.c.) Sign (avg.c.) Secret key
XMSS+ 16 0 16 6,700 133 96 3,312
XMSS+ 16 2 16 6,700 118 96 3,200
XMSS+ 16 4 16 6,700 97 83 3,232
XMSS+ 16 6 16 7,000 95 67 4,352
XMSS+ 16 8 16 8,000 94 53 10,112
of the secret key is around four kilo bytes and signatures are around two kilo bytes,
while the public keys are around 500 bytes. Increasing the tree height for XMSS
almost doubles key generation time. For XMSSMT the key generation time is almost
doubled if one increases the height by two, as this means that the height of each
internal tree is increased by one.
The results show that we can reduce the signature size by increasing the Win-
ternitz parameter w. The behavior of the implementation reflects the theory. The
factor for the reduction of the W-OTS signature size is only logarithmic in w. The
increase of the runtime is negligible for small w. This can be explained by the
following. While the length of the single function chains increases, the number of
chains decreases. For w > 16 the increase of the runtime becomes almost linear.
So from this point of view, w = 16 seems to be a good choice. On the other hand,
the provable security level also decreases almost linearly in w. This problem can be
solved using W-OTS+ instead of W-OTS$. In Table 7.2 we show the security level
for W-OTS+ in parentheses. The values show that using W-OTS+ we can achieve
a security level of more then 90 bits for all presented parameter sets but one.
Table 7.3 shows two things. On the one hand, it is possible to decrease the average
signing time spending more storage for the secret key state, by increasing k. This
is what one assumes given the theory. On the other hand, the worst case signing
time can only be reduced up to a certain limit. For the given parameters this limit
is 94ms, the worst case signing time, when both trees are completely stored. These
94ms are mainly caused by the write operations, when one key pair on the lower
layer is finished. While all the computations are done in previous rounds, the data
structures for the next lower layer key pair have to be copied to the data structure
for the current lower layer key pair. Furthermore the new data structures for the
next lower layer key pair must be initialized. Choosing k = 4 seems to be the most
7.3 Smart Card Implementation 89
reasonable choice for h = 16.
Comparison. The last rows of Table 7.2 show the results for XMSS. The results
show that XMSS key generation can be done on the smart card but is impractical
as it already takes more than 15 minutes for h = 16. Increasing the height by one
almost doubles the runtime of key generation. Generating a key with XMSSMT
is already for h = 16 almost 200 times faster than with XMSS. While XMSSMT
signature generation is slightly faster for comparable parameters, verification is faster
for XMSS. The faster key generation is paid for by slightly bigger secret keys
and signatures, while the XMSSMT public keys are smaller, because of the reused
bitmasks.
XMSSMT seems to be the better choice for a smart card implementation and thus
we compare it with RSA 2048 and ECDSA 256 on the same smart card. The key
generation performance of XMSSMT is similar to RSA 2048, which needs on average
11 seconds but slower than ECDSA 256 (95ms). Signature generation is comparable
to RSA 2048 (190ms) and ECDSA 256 (100ms). Only verification takes slightly
longer than with RSA 2048 (7ms) but it is faster than with ECDSA 256 (58ms).
The security level of RSA 2048 and ECDSA 256 is 95 and 128 bits, respectively. In
contrast to the security level shown in Table 7.2, these numbers are not based on
a security proof but on the best known attacks. As mentioned above, the security
level of XMSSMT is 128 bit, when we only assume the best known attacks.
NVM. The changing key presents a challenge for the implementation of XMSSMT
and XMSS on smart cards. NVM is organized in sectors and pages. Due to physical
limitations only complete pages can be written (erased and reprogrammed) at once.
Furthermore, they wear out and cannot be programmed anymore after a certain
number of write cycles, depending on the technology (about 500, 000 in our case).
However, as write operations are distributed over all 33 physical pages of a sector,
the complete available cycles are around 16.5 million per sector.
Generating a key takes only a few hundred write cycles but its state has to be
updated after each signature step. Overall, one million available signatures require
one million write cycles for the modification of the state. Using careful memory
management, layout and optimization, we managed to keep the number of write
cycles below five million for a key pair with h = 20, which is far below the 16.5
million available per sector. This includes key generation and all 220 signatures. It
should be noted that this affects only one NVM sector of the card. To use multiple
keys, they can be placed in different sectors in order to preserve NVM quality.

8 Conclusion
In this work, we introduced XMSS and XMSSMT , two forward secure signature
schemes with minimal security assumptions. Towards this end we introduced two
new OTS: W-OTS+ and W-OTS$. One of them has provably minimal security
assumptions, while the other comes with a tighter security reduction and security
assumptions that are conjectured to be minimal. We showed how to select opti-
mal parameters for given use cases reaching a provable security level and how to
implement the used function families. Moreover, we presented experimental data,
which show that our schemes have a performance comparable to that of today’s
signature schemes. This is especially interesting as our schemes fulfill the stronger
security notion of forward security. With this work we showed that it is possible
to construct practical (forward secure) signature schemes using minimal security
assumptions that can even be implemented on smartcards.
This work shows that our schemes are ready to be used in practice. They are
favorable in many use cases, especially when it comes to mid- or long-term security,
i.e. if the validity of a signature has to be verifiable for more than some seconds. This
includes important use cases like certification authority certificate signing, document
signatures, software updates and more. The reason is that in these cases the forward
security guarantees that signatures remain valid after a key compromise without
any additional measures. And key compromises happen, even in case of certification
authorities [Com13, ho13a, ho13b].
While we were concerned with constructing the schemes and analyzing them,
there are still open questions about how to use forward secure signature schemes in
practice. It turns out that it is not straightforward to combine FSS with today’s
public key infrastructures. In a separate paper we make a first attempt in this
direction [BHW+13] but this is out of the scope of this work.
Another issue using forward secure schemes in practice is the use of a state.
Forward secure signature schemes are necessarily stateful and so are XMSS and
XMSSMT . From a technical point of view, this should not pose a problem as we
showed that even the non volatile memory on a smartcard that wears out over time
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can handle XMSSMT key pairs. However, using a stateful signature scheme, the
common bad habit of generating backup copies of signing keys must be prevented.
But creating backups of signing keys should be prevented anyway, as it increases
the probability of a key compromise. There are other strategies to handle the case
of data loss, like keeping a different key pair with a valid certificate as backup.
Anyway, users have to be aware of this requirement when using forward secure
signature schemes.
Besides our main result, some of our smaller contributions are interesting on their
own. W-OTS+ is currently the most efficient hash-based OTS that guarantees strong
unforgeability using standard assumptions. Our approach of choosing optimal pa-
rameters using linear optimization might also be interesting for other cryptographic
schemes with a variety of parameters, e.g. lattice-based schemes. Our XMSSMT
smartcard implementation is the first implementation of a FSS on smartcards and
shows the feasibility and practical usability of forward secure signature schemes.
Future Work There still exist some challenges that are related to this work. The
first one, we already discussed above, is to use FSS in real application. Besides,
there are also more theoretical questions. So far, our schemes are the only FSS that
resist quantum computer aided attacks. All non-generic constructions are based on
problems from number theory. It is an interesting challenge to construct non-generic
FSS using security assumptions that are conjectured to resist quantum computers
like assumptions from the field of lattice- or code-based cryptography.
Moreover, we showed that our schemes can be constructed from any one-way
function, but this is only an existential relation. Regarding efficiency, we only showed
that our schemes are efficient if the used second-preimage resistant hash function
family and the pseudorandom function family are efficient. To show that our schemes
are efficient if we start from any efficient one-way function, we would need efficient
constructions of second-preimage resistant hash function families and pseudorandom
function families from any one-way function. While great improvements were made
in this field during the last decade [HHR+10, HRV10], the constructions are still far
from being efficient. It would be a great achievement to further improve the existing
constructions.
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